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Abstract
We develop a microeconomic model of endogenous growth where clean and dirty technologies com-
pete in production and innovation￿ in the sense that research can be directed to either clean or dirty
technologies. If dirty technologies are more advanced to start with, the potential transition to clean
technology can be di¢ cult both because clean research must climb several rungs to catch up with
dirty technology and because this gap discourages research e⁄ort directed towards clean technologies.
Carbon taxes and research subsidies may nonetheless encourage production and innovation in clean
technologies, though the transition will typically be slow. We characterize certain general properties of
the transition path from dirty to clean technology. We then estimate the model using a combination of
regression analysis on the relationship between R&D and patents, and simulated method of moments
using microdata on employment, production, R&D, ￿rm growth, entry and exit from the US energy
sector. The model￿ s quantitative implications match a range of moments not targeted in the estimation
quite well. We then characterize the optimal policy path implied by the model and our estimates.
Optimal policy makes heavy use of research subsidies as well as carbon taxes. We use the model to
evaluate the welfare consequences of a range of alternative policies.
JEL Classi￿cation: O30, O31, O33, C65.
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Recent economic research recognizes the importance of the transition to clean technology in
controlling and reducing fossil fuel emissions and potentially limiting climate change,1 while
empirical evidence suggests that innovation may switch away from dirty to clean technologies in
response to changes in prices and policies. For example, Newell, Ja⁄e and Stavins (1999) show
that following the oil price hikes, innovation in air-conditioners turned towards producing more
energy-e¢ cient units compared to the previous focus on price reduction; Popp (2002) ￿nds that
higher energy prices are associated with a signi￿cant increase in energy-saving innovations;
Hassler, Krusell and Olovsson (2011) estimate a trend break in factor productivities in the
energy-saving direction following the era of higher oil prices; and Aghion et al. (2014) ￿nd a
sizable impact of carbon taxes on the direction of innovation in the automobile industry and
further provide evidence that clean innovation has a self-perpetuating nature feeding on its past
success. Based on this type of evidence, Acemoglu et al. (2012) suggest that a combination of
(temporary) research subsidies and carbon taxes can successfully redirect technological change
towards cleaner technologies. Several conceptual and quantitative questions remain, however.
The ￿rst is whether, in the context of a micro-founded quantitative model, reasonable policies
can secure a transition to clean technology. The second is whether there is an important role for
signi￿cant research subsidies conditional on optimally-chosen carbon taxes. The third concerns
how rapidly the transition to clean technology should take place under optimal policy.
A systematic investigation of these questions necessitates a microeconomic model of inno-
vation and production where clean and dirty technologies compete given the prevailing policies,
and the direction of technological change is determined as a function of these policies.2 It also
necessitates a combination of micro data for the modeling of competition in production and
innovation with a quantitative model ￿ exible enough to represent realistic dynamics of carbon
emissions and potential climate change. This paper is an attempt in this direction.
Our ￿rst contribution is to develop a tractable microeconomic model for this purpose. In
our model, which we view as an abstract representation of the energy production and delivery
sectors, a continuum of intermediate goods can be produced either using a dirty or clean
technology, each of which has a knowledge stock represented by a separate quality ladder.
Given production taxes￿ which di⁄er by type of technology, and thus can act as a ￿carbon
1On climate change, see, e.g., Stott et al. (2004) on the contribution of human activity to the European
heatwave of 2003; Emanuel (2005) and Landsea (2005) on the increased impact and destructiveness of tropical
cyclones and Atlantic hurricanes over the last decades; and Nicholls and Lowe (2006) on sea-level rise. On
economic costs of climate change, see Mendelsohn et al. (1994), Pizer (1999), and Weitzman (2009). On
economic analyses of climate change, see Golosov et al. (2014), Hassler and Krusell (2012), Krusell and Smith
(2009), MacCracken et al. (1999), Nordhaus (1994), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Nordhaus (2008), and Stern
(2007). On endogenous technology and climate change, see, Acemoglu et al. (2012), Bovenberg and Smulders
(1995, 1996), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Grimaud et al. (2011), Hartley et al.
(2011), Hassler, Krusell and Olovsson (2011), Popp (2002, 2004), and Van der Zwaan et al. (2002).
2Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume that clean and dirty inputs are combined with a constant elasticity of
substitution, which allows for a limited form of competition between clean and dirty technologies.
1tax￿ ￿ ￿nal good producers choose which technology to utilize. Pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms also
decide whether to conduct research to improve clean or dirty technologies. Clean research,
for example, leads to an improvement over the leading-edge clean technology in one of the
product lines, though there is also a small probability of a breakthrough which will build on
and surpass the dirty technology when the dirty technology is the frontier in the relevant
product line. Research and innovation decisions are impacted by both policies and the current
state of technology. For example, when clean technology is far behind, most research directed to
that sector will generate incremental innovations that cannot be pro￿tably produced (unless
there are very high levels of carbon taxes). However, if clean research can be successfully
maintained for a while, it gradually becomes self-sustaining as the range of clean technologies
that can compete with dirty ones expands as a result of a series of incremental innovations.
Our second contribution is to estimate parameters of this model using microdata on R&D
expenditures, patents, sales, employment and ￿rm entry and exit from a sample of US ￿rms
in the energy sector. The data we use for this exercise are from the Census Bureau￿ s Longi-
tudinal Business Database and Economic Censuses, the National Science Foundation￿ s Survey
of Industrial Research and Development, and the NBER Patent Database. We design our
sample around innovative ￿rms in the energy sector that are in operation during the 1975-2004
period.3 We use our sample to estimate two of the key parameters of the model with regression
analysis using R&D and patents. We also estimate the initial distribution of productivity gaps
between clean and dirty technologies in the economy by allocating the patent stocks of ￿rms
innovating in these technology areas across the three-digit industries in which the ￿rms are
operating. The remaining key parameters are estimated using simulated method of moments.
We show that, despite its parsimony, the ￿t of the model to a rich and diverse set of moments
not targeted in the estimation is fairly good.
We then combine this structure with a ￿ exible model of the carbon cycle (also used in
Golosov et al., 2014). Our ￿nal and main contribution is to use this estimated quantitative
model for the analysis of optimal policy and for a range of counterfactual policy experiments.
Though it is intuitive to expect that carbon taxes should do most of the work in the optimal
allocation￿ because they both reduce current emissions and encourage R&D directed to clean
technologies￿ we ￿nd a major role for both carbon taxes and research subsidies. The research
subsidy is initially more aggressive and then declines over time, while we ￿nd that optimal
carbon taxes are backloaded (but also start declining after about 130 years). Despite the
di⁄erences between the models, the reason for the major role for research subsidies is related to
the one emphasized in Acemoglu et al. (2012).4 Research subsidies are powerful in redirecting
3See Popp (2006) and Ja⁄e et al. (2010) for background on technology, R&D and innovation in the energy
sector.
4Major di⁄erences between the models include: [1] here the damage from atmospheric carbon is modeled
as impacting production, along the lines of previous literature, rather than directly utility; [2] there is no
￿environmental disaster￿threshold, making it possible for us to calibrate the parameters more closely to data
and without taking a position on carbon emissions in the rest of the world; [3] in contrast to the constant
2technological change, and given this, it is not worth distorting the initial production too much
by introducing very high carbon taxes. It is important to emphasize that research subsidies are
not used simply to correct a market failure (or an uninternalized externality) in research. In
fact, in our model, in the absence of externalities from carbon, or in the special case in which
there is only a dirty or a clean sector, the social planner does not have a reason to use research
subsidies. This is because a scarce factor, skilled labor, is being used only for research, and
thus the social planner cannot increase the growth rate by subsidizing research.5 The reason
why the social planner relies heavily on research subsidies is because when carbon emissions
create negative externalities, inducing a transition to clean technology is an e⁄ective way of
reducing future carbon emissions.
In terms of counterfactual policies, we investigate the welfare costs of just relying on car-
bon taxes and delaying intervention. Delaying optimal policy by 50 years has a welfare cost
equivalent to a permanent 1:7% drop in consumption. The costs of relying only on the carbon
tax, without any research subsidies, is similar￿ 1:9%. Another useful comparison is to current
US policies. We estimate the e⁄ective research subsidy from the di⁄erential between clean
and dirty ￿rms in our sample in the use of federally funded R&D expenditure. Utilizing this
estimate and di⁄erent values of e⁄ective carbon tax at the moment and its likely values in the
future, our estimated optimal policies are quite di⁄erent from their US counterparts, and we
show that under current US policies, climate change dynamics will be signi￿cantly worse.
We also consider several variations and robustness checks to show which aspects of the
model are important for our main theoretical and quantitative results. In particular, we inves-
tigate the implications of using di⁄erent discount rates and estimates of the damage of carbon
concentration on economic activity, allowing for alternative modelling of emissions, di⁄erent
degrees of distortions from research subsidies, di⁄erent estimates of the microeconomic elas-
ticities in the R&D technology, and di⁄erent distributions of initial productivity gaps between
clean and dirty technologies. Overall, most of the main qualitative and quantitative features of
optimal policy are fairly robust across a range of plausible variations, though a few variations
lead to optimal policies that are more aggressive and involve carbon taxes reaching higher
levels and remaining high for 200 years or more.
Our model combines elements from four di⁄erent lines of research, and is thus related to
each of these four lines. First, we build on the growing literature on quantitative general equi-
librium models of climate change, such as Golosov et al. (2014), Hassler and Krusell (2012),
elasticity of substitution formulation of Acemoglu et al. (2012), dirty and clean sectors are not (q-)complements
in our model, but explicitly compete in each product line; [4] because of breakthrough innovations, even with
fairly aggressive research subsidies and carbon taxes, the dirty sector is eliminated very slowly (in more than
1000 years); and [5] we also allow for research subsidies to create distortions, which plays some role in our
quantitative policy conclusions. The third one is one of the most important microeconomic di⁄erence, making
the production structure more realistic and enabling us to use microdata on innovation and production.
5The social planner could a⁄ect growth by reallocating research activity between incumbents and entrants,
but this is neither quantitatively important nor allowed in our analysis (because we restrict subsidies/taxes on
the incumbents and entrants to be the same).
3Adao et al. (2012), Krusell and Smith (2009), Nordhaus (1994), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000),
Nordhaus (2008), and Stern (2007). We follow these papers in introducing a simple model of
the carbon cycle and the economic costs of carbon emissions in a general equilibrium model,
and then characterizing optimal policy. Second, we introduce endogenous and directed tech-
nological change along the lines of Acemoglu (1998, 2002) in a model where producers have
a choice between clean and dirty production methods. In combining these two ￿rst lines of
research, we are following Acemoglu et al. (2012) as well as several other papers listed in
footnote 1 above. Third, we develop a tractable but rich model of competition between dirty
and clean technologies building on the literature on step-by-step competition as in Harris and
Vickers (1995), Aghion et al. (2001), and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). Fourth, we model the
microeconomics of innovation, employment and output dynamics building on Klette and Kor-
tum (2004), where each ￿rm consists of a number of products and technologies (di⁄erent from
other applications, technologies here are di⁄erent from products because of the competition
between clean and dirty sectors).
In estimating a general equilibrium model of ￿rm-level innovation and employment dy-
namics, we follow Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), and Acemoglu et al.
(2013). We di⁄er from existing work in this area in three important respects, however. First,
we combine this type of estimation strategy with a model of clean and dirty technologies and
estimate some of the parameters of the R&D technology directly from microdata. Second,
rather than focusing on steady-state comparisons, we study non-steady-state dynamics, which
is crucial for the question of transitioning to clean technology. Third, we characterize optimal
policies in such a framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and
characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 describes the dataset we use for estimation and quan-
titative evaluation, outlines the di⁄erent components of our estimation strategy, and presents
the estimates of some of the parameters we obtain from our micro data. Section 4 presents the
simulated method of moments estimates of our parameters and discusses the ￿t of the model.
Section 5 quantitatively characterizes the structure of optimal environmental policy. In this
section, we also conduct a range of counterfactual exercises. Section 6 discusses a range of
robustness exercises intended to convey which sorts of assumptions and parameters are impor-
tant for the qualitative and quantitative results of the paper. Section 7 concludes, while the
Online Appendix contains additional details and proofs.
2 Model
This section presents our baseline model, which is a simple dynamic general equilibrium setup
where ￿nal output combines intermediates produced either using a clean or dirty technology,
and the dirty technology also uses an exhaustible resource such as oil. The productivity of the
dirty and clean technology for each intermediate is represented by a quality ladder. Production
4is also subject to taxes, so pro￿t-maximizing ￿nal good producers choose whether to use clean or
dirty intermediates as a function of taxes and the productivity gap between the two. Research
is conducted both by entrants and incumbent ￿rms, which already hold a portfolio of products
and technologies, and is directed towards clean or dirty technology. Finally, dirty technology
contributes to carbon emissions, which create potential economic damage. We next describe
each aspect of the model in turn and characterize the equilibrium.
2.1 Preferences and Endowments
We model an in￿nite-horizon closed economy in continuous time. Since the consumer side is
not our focus, we simplify the discussion by modeling it with a representative household with
a logarithmic instantaneous utility function and lifetime utility given by
U0 =
Z 1
0
e￿￿t lnCtdt;
where Ct is the representative household￿ s consumption at time t and ￿ > 0 is the discount
rate. The representative household is comprised of unskilled workers, with measure normalized
to 1, and ￿scientists,￿with measure Ls, who will be employed in R&D activities. All workers
supply one unit of labor inelastically. The household owns all the ￿rms in the economy, so it
maximizes lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraint
wu
t + ws
tLs + ￿t ￿ Tt ￿ Ct;
and the usual no Ponzi condition. Here ￿t is the total sum of corporate pro￿ts net of R&D
expenses, wu
t and ws
t are the wage rates (and thus wage incomes) of the unskilled and R&D
workers, and Tt is the net lump-sum tax (or transfer) used for balancing the government budget.
Because research subsidies may create additional distortions (denoted by Dt), there may be a
wedge between consumption and output, so that Ct + Dt = Yt.
2.2 Final Good Technology, Intermediate Production and Pricing
The ￿nal good is produced by combining a measure one of intermediates with an elasticity of
substitution equal to one. In addition, its production is negatively a⁄ected by the amount of
atmospheric carbon concentration, which we denote by St. We follow the formulation suggested
by Golosov et al. (2014), which builds on earlier work by Mendelsohn et al. (1994), Nordhaus
(1994, 2008) and Stern (2007), and assume
lnYt = ￿￿
￿
St ￿ ￿ S
￿
+
Z 1
0
lnyi;tdi; (1)
where ￿ S > 0 is the pre-industrial level of the atmospheric carbon concentration, ￿ ￿ 0 is a
scale parameter, and yi;t is the quantity of intermediate good i. When ￿ = 0, (1) gives the
standard aggregate production function for combining intermediates to produce a ￿nal good
5with unit elasticity of substitution. When ￿ > 0, levels of atmospheric carbon concentration
above the pre-industrial level reduce productivity with an elasticity of ￿.
A feature of (1), which will play a central role in our quantitative exercise, is worth noting:
the proportional cost of a unit increase in atmospheric carbon concentration is independent
of its current level. Though non-linearities, or even major threshold e⁄ects, are likely to be
present in the impact of atmospheric concentration on economic activity, this functional form
is consistent with assumptions made by other economic approaches to climate change (e.g.,
Nordhaus, 1994, 2002, 2007; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Stern, 2007; Golosov et al., 2014).
Each intermediate i 2 [0;1] can be produced with either a dirty or a clean technology,
and when it is produced with the clean (dirty) technology, we denote it by yc
i;t (yd
i;t). We will
sometimes refer to clean and dirty technologies as clean and dirty ￿sectors,￿and also use the
terms ￿intermediates￿and ￿product lines￿interchangeably.
Firm f can produce intermediate i with either a clean or dirty technology (j 2 fc;dg). The
production function for clean technology is
yc
i;t (f) = qc
i;t (f)lc
i;t (f);
where lc
i;t (f) is employment of production workers and qc
i;t (f) is the labor productivity of the
technology that this ￿rm has access to for producing with clean technology in product line
i.6 Focusing on the ￿rm with the most productive clean technology for this intermediate and
suppressing ￿rm indices, we often write this as yc
i;t = qc
i;tlc
i;t:
The production function for dirty technology is similar, except that it also uses an ex-
haustible resource ei;t:
yd
i;t (f) = qd
i;t (f)ld
i;t (f)
1￿￿ ei;t (f)
￿ ; (2)
where ￿ 2 (0;1). We assume that the exhaustible resource is owned by a set of competitive
￿rms, which can extract it with the following technology relying on unskilled labor:
ei;t = ￿le
i;t;
where ￿ > 0. This implies that the marginal cost of extraction is ce;t = wu
t =￿. The stock of
exhaustible resource, Rt, evolves according to the law of motion
_ Rt = ￿
Z 1
0
ei;tdi: (3)
Pro￿t maximization of resource owners combined with this law of motion implies that the price
of the exhaustible resource, pe;t, follows the Hotelling rule. In particular, this price minus the
cost of extraction must grow at the rate of interest (i.e., pe;t ￿ ￿wu
t grows at the rate rt).
6Capital can be introduced as an additional factor of production following Golosov et al. (2014), but would
further complicate our setup. Given our focus on technology choice and endogenous innovation, we have not
pursued this generalization.
6The cost minimization problem of producers using a dirty technology implies
ei;t =
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
wu
t
pe;t
￿
ld
i;t: (4)
Combining this with (2) gives a linear relationship between the output of dirty producers and
labor
yd
i;t =
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
wu
t
pe;t
￿￿
￿ qd
i;tld
i;t:
Only ￿rms with the most advanced technology for intermediate i within the clean or dirty
sector will ￿nd it pro￿table to produce it. However, because of taxes ￿
j
t on sector j at time
t, it is not necessarily the most advanced technology between these two sectors that will be
active. Given these taxes, the marginal cost of production in line i is
MCi;t =
8
<
:
(1+￿c
t)wu
t
qc
i;t if produced with clean technology
(1+￿d
t)wu
t ~ Pe;t
qd
i;t
if produced with dirty technology
;
where wu
t is the wage rate of unskilled workers and
~ Pe;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
￿
pe;t
wu
t ￿
￿￿
(5)
is the normalized price of the exhaustible resource at time t. In equilibrium, only the technology
with the lower marginal cost inclusive of taxes￿ or equivalently the one with the higher tax-
adjusted labor productivity￿ will produce. Equilibrium production decisions are:
produce intermediate i with
8
> <
> :
clean technology if
qc
i;t
1+￿c
t >
qd
i;t
(1+￿d
t) ~ Pe;t
dirty technology if
qc
i;t
1+￿c
t <
qd
i;t
(1+￿d
t) ~ Pe;t
: (6)
We assume that if condition (6) holds with equality, each technology produces with probability
50% at any point in time.7
Finally, we also assume that at the initial date t = 0, for each leading technology of quality
q
j
i;0, there also exists an intermediate good of quality q
j
i;0=￿. This ensures that markups in the
initial date will be equal to ￿, and this result will hold endogenously in all subsequent dates.
2.3 Innovation, the Quality Ladder and Dynamics
Labor productivity for each intermediate (for each technology) evolves as a result of innovation.
Research is directed towards clean or dirty technologies. Successful research leads to one of two
types of innovation. The ￿rst is an incremental innovation, which takes place with probability
1 ￿ ￿; and the second is a breakthrough innovation, which takes place with probability ￿
(independently of all other events).
7This condition will hold as an inequality ￿generically,￿i.e., for almost all values of the normalized price of
the exhaustible resource, ~ Pe;t.
7If research directed to sector j 2 fc;dg leads to an incremental innovation, then the in-
novator advances by one rung in the quality ladder over the current leading-edge technology
of type j in a randomly chosen intermediate. Breakthrough innovations, on the other hand,
enable the successful innovator to improve by one rung over the frontier technology, even if this
frontier is set by the alternative technology￿ i.e., a breakthrough clean innovation improves
over the dirty technology even if the latter is far ahead of the clean sector, thus allowing the
clean sector to leapfrog the dirty one.8
We assume that each rung in the quality ladder corresponds to a proportional improvement
of ￿ > 1. Consequently, labor productivity of technology j in intermediate i at time t can be
expressed as q
j
i;t = ￿
n
j
i;t; where n
j
i;t 2 Z+ is the e⁄ective number of steps that this technology
has taken since time t = 0 (where the initial levels, q
j
i;0￿ s, are set equal to 1 for all i and j
without loss of any generality). This also implies that an incremental innovation during an
interval of time ￿t leads to a new technology with q
j
i;t+￿t = ￿q
j
i;t (i.e., an improvement of
proportional amount ￿ over the leading technology in the same sector), while a breakthrough
innovation in sector j that is behind sector ￿j (i.e., with q
j
i;t < q
￿j
i;t ) leads to a new technology
with q
j
i;t+￿t = ￿q
￿j
i;t , meaning that it builds on the more-advanced technology level of sector
￿j.
Given this speci￿cation, the relative productivity of dirty to clean technology in interme-
diate i at time t can be written as
qd
i;t
qc
i;t
= ￿ni;t;
where ni;t ￿ nd
i;t ￿ nc
i;t 2 Z is de￿ned as the technology gap between dirty and clean sectors in
product line i at time t.
Denoting by z
j
t the aggregate innovation rate (the sum of incumbents￿and entrants￿inno-
vation rates) in technology j, the law of motion for the technology gap ni;t can be expressed
as
ni;t+￿t =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
ni;t ￿ 1 with probability (1 ￿ ￿)zc
t￿t + o(￿t) 8ni;t
ni;t + 1 with probability (1 ￿ ￿)zd
t ￿t + o(￿t) 8ni;t
￿1 with probability ￿zc
t￿t + o(￿t) if ni;t > 0
ni;t ￿ 1 with probability ￿zc
t￿t + o(￿t) if ni;t ￿ 0
1 with probability ￿zd
t ￿t + o(￿t) if ni;t ￿ 0
ni;t + 1 with probability ￿zd
t ￿t + o(￿t) if ni;t > 0
ni;t otherwise
;
where o(￿t) represent second-order terms that disappear faster than ￿t as ￿t goes to zero.
Let us next denote the price-adjusted policy gap by mt, such that
mt ￿
1
ln￿
"
ln
 ￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿
(1 + ￿c
t)
~ Pe;t
!#
;
8Note that innovations here have a creative destruction element (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman
and Helpman, 1991) because, by improving over an existing product typically operated by another ￿rm, they
transfer the leading-edge technology to the current innovator.
8where ~ Pe;t is given by (5). The tax-adjusted technology gap can therefore be written as
qd
i;t
qc
i;t
￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿
(1 + ￿c
t)
1
~ Pe;t
= ￿ni;t￿mt:
The leading-edge tax-adjusted technology in intermediate i is dirty if ni;t > mt; the two
technologies are neck and neck if ni;t = mt; and clean is the leading technology otherwise.
2.4 Firms, R&D and Free Entry
Following Klette and Kortum (2004), we de￿ne a ￿rm as a collection of leading-edge technolo-
gies. Let u
j
f denote the number of intermediates where ￿rm f has the leading-edge technology
within sector j 2 fc;dg, though these may not be the most advanced technology for the in-
termediate in question because there is also a competing technology ￿j. We assume that u
j
f
captures the stock of knowledge on which the ￿rm can build for further innovations with tech-
nology j 2 fc;dg. In view of this and without any loss of generality, we simplify the exposition
by assuming that each ￿rm specializes in either clean or dirty technologies. Each ￿rm can
then combine its knowledge stock u
j
f (in sector/technology j) with scientists (R&D workers)
H
j
f in order to generate a Poisson ￿ ow rate of X
j
f new innovations according to the production
function
X
j
f = ￿
￿
H
j
f
￿￿ ￿
u
j
f
￿1￿￿
; (7)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the R&D elasticity with respect to scientists and ￿ > 0. The variable cost
of generating a ￿ ow rate of Xj is therefore ws
tuhj, where
hj(xj) =
￿
xj
￿
￿ 1
￿
(8)
is the demand for skilled workers (as scientists) given innovation intensity per product line of
xj ￿ Xj=uj and ws
t is the wage rate of scientists (we have dropped the ￿rm index to simplify
notation). There is in addition a ￿xed cost associated with R&D, which is again in terms
of skilled workers. In particular, to perform any R&D ￿rm f will need to hire FI;i scientists
per product line, where FI;i;t 2 [(1 ￿ ￿)FI;(1 + ￿)FI] is an iid draw (across ￿rms and over
time) with mean FI and ￿ 2 (0;1).9 Hence, the total cost of R&D for ￿rm i performing R&D
directed at technology j 2 fc;dg at time t is Ct
￿
u;xj￿
= ws
tu
￿
hj + FI;i;t
￿
.
Entrants can also undertake R&D directed to either sector by paying a variable cost as in
(8) and a ￿xed cost in terms of FE ￿ FI scientists. We denote the endogenously determined
mass of entrants performing R&D directed to technology j at time t by E
j
t.
9This heterogeneity in ￿xed costs is useful for smoothing out the dynamics. In particular, because of ￿creative
destruction,￿ the equilibrium path in this class of models involves some ￿rms stopping R&D (as clean ￿rms
will do without policy change and dirty ￿rms do under our optimal policy). This will lead to a discontinuous
behavior shortly before this point because of the expectation that creative destruction will cease. Heterogeneity
in ￿xed costs smooths this transition.
9On the policy side, R&D for sector j receives a proportional government subsidy at the
rate s
j
t 2 [0;1]. Though the government uses lump-sum taxes to ￿nance its budget shortfall,
subsidies to speci￿c types of research create various distortionary e⁄ects (e.g., because of the
ine¢ ciency of picking winners or misdirection of resources). We allow for this by introducing
the parameter ￿ measuring the extent of such wastage and specifying the aforementioned wedge
between output and consumption as Dt = ￿St. This also implies that the government budget
at time t is
(1 + ￿)St = Tt:
2.5 The Carbon Cycle
While clean intermediate production yc
i;t creates no carbon emission, dirty production yd
i;t emits
￿ units of carbon per intermediate output.10 This implies that total amount of carbon emission
at time t is
Kt = ￿Y d
t ; (9)
where Y d
t =
R 1
0 yd
i;tdi is the total output of the dirty sectors such technology at time t. We
follow Archer (2005) and Golosov et al. (2014) in assuming that the atmospheric carbon
concentration St is determined as follows
St =
Z t￿T
0
(1 ￿ dl)Kt￿ldl; (10)
where t = T is the ￿rst date when emission started and
dl = (1 ￿ ’P)
h
1 ￿ ’0e￿’l
i
is the amount of carbon emitted l years ago still left in the atmosphere; ’P 2 (0;1) is the share
of emission that remains permanently in the atmosphere; (1 ￿ ’P)’0 2 (0;1) is the fraction of
the transitory component that remains in the ￿rst period; and ’ 2 (0;1) is the rate of decay of
carbon concentration over time. As explained in Archer (2005) and Golosov et al. (2014), this
speci￿cation approximates the complex dynamics of carbon concentration in the atmosphere
and provides a good match to the observed dynamics of atmospheric carbon concentration as
we show below.
10The assumption that carbon emissions are per unit of intermediate good produced with dirty technology is
a plausible baseline. Given our formulation with two types of technological changes, assuming that emissions
are directly from the the use of the exhaustible resource would amount to imposing that even dirty technological
improvements reduce e⁄ective emissions; this is because the same amount of dirty output, which in our empirical
work will correspond to energy output, can be obtained with less and less pollution over time￿ even without
any clean innovations. The main motivation for our baseline choice is to avoid this blurring of the distinction
between clean and dirty technologies. Alternative emission speci￿cations, where it is the use of the exhaustible
resource that creates emissions, and where the dirty sector does not use the exhaustible resource, are investigated
in Section 6.
102.6 Prices and Pro￿ts
The aggregate production function (1) implies a unit elastic demand for intermediates which,
taking the ￿nal good as numeraire, can be written as
yi;t =
Yt
pi;t
: (11)
To characterize equilibrium prices, we de￿ne the tax- and energy-price-adjusted (for ex-
haustible resource) qualities by
~ qd
i;t ￿
qd
i;t ￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿ ~ Pe;t
and ~ qc
i;t ￿
qc
i;t
1 + ￿c
t
.
Therefore, intermediate i will be produced using technology j 2 fc;dg only if ~ q
￿j
i;t ￿ ~ q
j
i;t.
Moreover, as explained in the previous section, if the leading technology for intermediate i
at time t is q
j
i;t, another ￿rm will have access to technology q
j
i;t=￿ for free, and therefore,
equilibrium markups can never exceed ￿. This implies that the price and quantity are given
as
p
j
i;t = min
(
￿wu
t
~ q
j
i;t
;
wu
t
~ q
￿j
i;t
)
; and y
j
i;t = max
(
~ q
j
i;t
￿wu
t
;
~ q
￿j
i;t
wu
t
)
￿ Yt: (12)
Equilibrium pro￿ts can then be computed as a function of mt and n as
￿d
n;t = ~ ￿ (n ￿ mt)Yt and ￿c
n;t = ~ ￿ (mt ￿ n)Yt; (13)
where
~ ￿ (k) ￿
(
0 if k ￿ 0;
￿(k)￿1
￿(k) otherwise,
and ￿(k) ￿ ￿k if k 2 [0;1] and ￿(k) = ￿ if k > 1 summarizes equilibrium markups.
2.7 Value Functions and Innovation Incentives
We now characterize innovation incentives. Let us focus on a single ￿rm, drop the ￿rm and
time indices to simplify notation, and let ~ nj ￿
h
n
j
1;:::;n
j
uj
i
denote the vector of product lines
where the ￿rm in question holds the leading-edge technology of type j 2 fc;dg and n
j
i is the
technology gap compared to technology ￿j within the same product line. Let ~ n
j
￿i denote the
same vector ~ nj without its ith element n
j
i: Then the value of the ￿rm satis￿es the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rV
j
~ nj ￿ _ V
j
~ nj (14)
=
Xu
i=1
2
6
6
4
￿
j
ni + zj
￿
V
j
~ n
j
￿i
￿ V
j
~ nj
￿
+
z￿j
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + I(n
j
i￿0)￿
￿￿
V
j
~ n
j
￿i[fn
j
i￿1g
￿ V
j
~ n
j
i
￿
+ I(n
j
i>0)z￿j￿
￿
V
j
~ n
j
￿i[f￿1g ￿ V
j
~ n
j
i
￿
3
7
7
5
+
Z
max
xj￿0
￿
ujxj
￿
EnV
j
~ nj[fn
j
u+1g ￿ V
j
~ nj
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ sj￿
ujws
￿
￿
xj￿ 1
￿ ￿
￿ 1
￿ + I(xj>0)FI
￿￿
dFI:
11The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the pro￿ts generated from uj product lines. In addition,
at the ￿ ow rate rate zj; each product line i will be lost to an innovation by another ￿rm from the
same technology j, in which case i is taken out of ￿rm￿ s portfolio (so that the ￿rm￿ s portfolio
becomes ~ n
j
￿i). If instead production line i experiences an innovation from the alternative
technology ￿j, which happens at the rate z￿j, then there are two possibilities. First, if the
innovation is incremental (probability 1 ￿ ￿) or technology j is already behind
￿
n
j
i ￿ 0
￿
, the
technology gap declines by one step to n
j
i = n
j
i ￿1. Second, if the innovation is a breakthrough
(probability ￿) and technology j was leading
￿
n
j
i > 0
￿
, then the ￿rm falls behind by one step
to n
j
i = ￿1. Finally, the ￿rm invests in R&D itself and innovates at the ￿ ow rate Xj = ujxj,
and the expected return from this R&D (inclusive of costs net of the R&D subsidy for this
sector, sj) is the ￿nal line of the right-hand side, with the integral accounting for the ￿xed
costs being stochastic. When successful, the ￿rm adds a new product line so that its portfolio
becomes ~ nj [ fn
j
u+1g.
Let us next denote by ￿n;t the fraction of product lines where the dirty lead is exactly
equal to n steps at time t. The next lemma provides a convenient re-expression of this HJB
equation:
Lemma 1 Equation (14) can be re-expressed as V
j
~ nj;t =
￿Pu
i=1 v
j
ni;t
￿
￿ Yt, where
~ rtv
j
ni;t ￿ _ v
j
ni;t = ~ ￿j
ni ￿ z
j
tv
j
ni;t + z
￿j
t
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + I(n
j
i￿0)￿
￿￿
v
j
ni￿1;t ￿ v
j
ni;t
￿
+ I(n
j
i>0)z
￿j
t ￿
￿
v
j
￿1;t ￿ v
j
ni;t
￿
+
Z
max
x
j
t￿0
￿
x
j
t￿ v
j
t ￿
￿
1 ￿ s
j
t
￿
~ ws
t
￿￿
x
j
t
￿ 1
￿ ￿
￿ 1
￿ + I(x
j
t>0)FI;t
￿￿
dFI;t; (15)
where ~ rt ￿ rt ￿ gY;t; is the e⁄ective interest rate (net of output growth), ~ ws
t ￿ ws
t=Yt is the
normalized skilled wage and ￿ v
j
t is the expected per product value of innovation de￿ned as
￿ vd
t ￿
X
n￿0
￿n;tvd
n+1;t +
X
n<0
￿n;t
h
(1 ￿ ￿)vd
n+1;t + ￿vd
1;t
i
; and (16)
￿ vc
t ￿
X
n￿0
￿n;tvc
n￿1;t +
X
n>0
￿n;t
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)vc
n￿1;t + ￿vc
￿1;t
￿
:
Proof of Lemma 1. See the Online Appendix.
Intuitively, because there are no technological or product market linkages between the
di⁄erent product lines in which the ￿rm has a lead, its value can be written as the sum of
the values of each one of its product lines. An important implication of this result is that
incumbent innovation rates per product line are independent of their portfolios:
x
j
t = I(x
j
I;t>0)
0
@ ￿￿
1
￿ ￿ v
j
t ￿
1 ￿ s
j
t
￿
~ ws
t
1
A
￿
1￿￿
for j 2 fc;dg; (17)
where v
j
n;t is the solution to (15), ￿ v
j
t is given as in (16), and ~ ws
t is the normalized skilled wage
de￿ned in Lemma 1. A number of important qualitative conclusions follow from (17):
12I. Higher average values of innovation and lower scientist wages increase research e⁄ort.
II. Subsidies to research increase research e⁄ort. This will be important in encouraging
clean innovation by means of research subsidies.
III. Carbon taxes increase clean research e⁄ort (and reduce dirty research e⁄ort). This can
be seen by considering higher values of m in (13) which, given the distribution of technology
gaps ￿n;t, increases ￿c
n;t and ￿ vc
t, because production shifts from dirty to clean technologies
(and neck-and-neck sectors shift to positive markups for clean technologies). This shows that
carbon taxes alone may be su¢ cient to encourage clean innovation and thus a transition to
clean technology. Whether they are optimal is an empirical and quantitative question we
consider below.
IV. Perhaps most importantly, the nature of innovation is path-dependent in this economy.
Consider the fraction of sectors in which clean producers are already making positive pro￿ts.
The average pro￿ts for clean producers is ￿c
t ￿
X
n<m
￿n;t￿t (mt ￿ n): Since the value function
is determined as the discounted sum of these average pro￿ts, the sequence f￿c
tg1
t=0 has a direct
impact on innovation incentives through ￿ vc
t: When there are large technology gaps between dirty
and clean, ￿c
t is small, discouraging clean innovation and encouraging dirty innovation. But if
clean innovation is maintained for a while, then the fraction of sectors with n ￿ m increases,
raising the probability that clean innovation will improve over a pro￿table intermediate. Thus
clean innovation can naturally self-reinforce over time, but this is a slow process because the
fraction of sectors with n ￿ m changes slowly.
2.8 Free Entry and Labor Market Clearing
The previous subsection characterized the R&D decisions of incumbents as a function of the
state of the economy and policies. The other component of R&D comes from entrants. Using
similar reasoning to that for incumbent R&D incentives, the free entry condition for entrants
for technology j 2 fc;dg is
max
x
j
E;t￿0
n
x
j
E;t￿ v
j
tYt ￿
￿
1 ￿ s
j
t
￿
ws
t
h
h
￿
x
j
E;t
￿
+ FE
io
￿ 0; (18)
holding as equality if E
j
t > 0. Inspection of (18) establishes that at time t, there can be
positive entry into sector j only if the ￿policy-adjusted￿value of innovation is higher in sector
j than in sector ￿j. In other words, entrants will direct their R&D to the clean technology if
￿ vc
t=(1 ￿ sc
t) > ￿ vd
t =
￿
1 ￿ sd
t
￿
and to the dirty technology if the reverse inequality holds. Condi-
tional on entry, the optimal value of x
j
E;t is given by equation (17), except that the indicator
function now conditions on R&D by entrants in sector j being positive, i.e., I(x
j
E;t>0).
The labor market clearing condition for skilled workers, combining demand from incum-
13bents and entrants, is
Ls =
X
j2fc;dg
￿
I(x
j
E;t>0)
￿
h(x
j
E;t) + FE
￿
E
j
t +
Z 1
0
I(x
j
i;t>0)
￿
h(x
j
I;t) + FI;i;t
￿
di
￿
; (19)
where h(￿) is de￿ned in (8) above, while x
j
E;t and x
j
I;t depend on the normalized skilled wage
~ ws
t via (17). This labor market clearing condition thus pins down this normalized skilled wage
and indicates that the equilibrium normalized skilled wage will be higher when R&D is more
pro￿table and is subsidized more heavily.
We next characterize labor market clearing for unskilled workers. From the equilibrium
production decisions in (12), demand for production workers is
li;t =
8
<
:
Yt
(1+￿c
i)￿(mt￿ni;t)wu
t
if ni;t ￿ mt
Yt
(1+￿d
i)￿(ni;t￿mt)wu
t
otherwise
:
Adding the labor used in the extraction of the exhaustible resource, unskilled labor market
clearing can be written as
1 =
Yt
wu
t
￿
8
<
:
X
n￿mt
￿n;t
(1 + ￿c
t)￿(mt ￿ n)
+
"
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
 
1=￿
~ Pe;t
!#
X
n>mt
￿n;t ￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿
￿(n ￿ mt)
9
=
;
:
(20)
This equation shows both the impact of taxes on labor demand (which reduce labor demand
and thus wages) and the distribution of technology gaps (because these a⁄ect markups). It
also shows that if there were only one type of technology (and no extraction of the exhaustible
resource), an increase in the tax rate would have no impact on production, just reducing the
unskilled wage rate. This is no longer true with two types of technologies, because a tax on
dirty technology, for example, would also change the prices of intermediates produced with
dirty technology relative to those produced by clean technology, thus impacting production.
Next substituting the optimal quantities (12) into the ￿nal good production function (1),
we obtain
wu
t = ￿ Qt￿t; (21)
where ￿ Qt ￿ exp
￿R
ln ~ qitdi
￿
is the quality index of active tax-adjusted labor productivities, and
￿t ￿
Y
n
￿(n ￿ mt)
￿￿n;t is an inverse function of equilibrium markups.
We can next use (20) to express aggregate output as a function of the quality index of
active tax-adjusted labor productivities:
Yt = ￿ Qt￿t￿￿1
t exp
￿
￿￿
￿
St ￿ ￿ S
￿￿
; (22)
where
￿t ￿
X
n￿mt
￿n;t
(1 + ￿c
t)￿(mt ￿ n)
+
"
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
 
1=￿
~ Pe;t
!#
X
n>mt
￿n;t ￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿
￿(n ￿ mt)
14is an adjustment for labor demand coming both from taxes and markups.
As noted above, pollution is caused by total dirty intermediate production at time t, which
can be expressed as
Y d
t =
Yt ￿
1 + ￿d
t
￿
wu
t ~ Pe;t
"
1
2
Qd
m;t +
1
￿(n ￿ m)
X
n>mt
Qd
n;t
#
; (23)
where we broke up the quality index by step-size di⁄erential n and de￿ne Qd
n;t ￿
R
i2￿n qd
i;tdi
(with a slight abuse of notation where i 2 ￿n denotes intermediates where the technology gap
is n steps). The evolution of the quality indices Qd
n;t and Qc
n;t are described in the Online
Appendix.
Intertemporal maximization yields the standard Euler equation,
gC;t = rt ￿ ￿; (24)
where gC;t is the growth rate of consumption and rt is the interest rate at time t (and in
addition we impose the usual transversality condition).
Hotelling rule implies that the exhaustible resource price net of the cost of extraction must
grow at the rate rt (i.e., at the interest rate), and thus, the exhaustible resource price net of
the cost of extraction relative to the unskilled wage,
pe;t￿￿wu
t
wu
t , must grow at the rate rt ￿ gw;t.
The implied path of the normalized exhaustible resource price is therefore
pe;t
wu
t
=
￿
pe;0
wu
0
￿ ￿
￿Z t
0
ers￿gw;sds + ￿: (25)
An additional boundary condition is given by the requirement that the price of the exhaustible
price must satisfy
lim
t!1
[pe;t ￿ ￿wu
t ]Rt = 0;
so that either the entire stock of the exhaustible resource is utilized as t ! 1 or pe;t = ￿wu
t
for all t ￿ 0.
Finally, the evolution of the distribution of technology gaps represented by ￿n;t can be
derived from the following di⁄erential equations (with some initial condition
￿
￿n;0
￿1
n=￿1).
For n > 1, we have
_ ￿n>1;t = zd
t ￿n￿1;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zc
t￿n+1;t ￿ zt￿n;t; (26)
where z
j
t ￿
￿
1 + E
j
t
￿
x
j
t and zt ￿ zd
t + zc
t. Intuitively, the fraction of intermediates with the
technology gap n changes because of the di⁄erence between in￿ ows and out￿ ows. There will
be in￿ ows into state n from n ￿ 1 when a dirty innovation occurs and from n + 1 when a
clean innovation occurs without leapfrogging. Out￿ ows from the technology gap of n steps will
take place due to both clean or dirty innovation (bringing the state into n + 1, n ￿ 1, or ￿1
15depending on the innovation type). For n ￿ 1, a similar reasoning identi￿es
_ ￿1;t = zd
t ￿0;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zc
t￿2;t + ￿zd
t
X
n<0
￿n;t ￿ zt￿1;t
_ ￿0;t = (1 ￿ ￿)zd
t ￿￿1;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zc
t￿1;t ￿ zt￿0;t (27)
_ ￿￿1;t = zc
t￿0;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zd
t ￿￿2;t + ￿zc
t
X
n>0
￿n;t ￿ zt￿￿1;t
_ ￿n<￿1;t = zc
t￿n+1;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zd
t ￿n￿1;t ￿ zt￿n;t:
We now summarize the dynamic equilibrium path using the equations we have derived in
this section. For any given time path of policies
h
￿
j
t;s
j
I;t;s
j
E;t
i1
t=0
; a dynamic equilibrium path
is characterized by time path of [y
j
i;t; p
j
i;t; x
j
I;t; x
j
E;t; Yt; ws
t; wu
t ; ei;t; pe;t; Rt; E
j
t; f￿n;tg1
n=￿1;
fQd
n;tg1
n=￿1; rt; St]1
t=0 such that [1] y
j
i;t and p
j
i;t maximize pro￿ts as in (12); [2] x
j
I;t and x
j
E;t
satisfy (17); [3] wu
t is determined by (21); [4] aggregate output Yt is given by (22); [5] ws is
determined from the free-entry condition (18) when there is positive entry and from skilled
labor market clearing (19) when there is no positive entry; [6] E
j
t is determined from the skilled
labor market clearing (19) when there is positive entry; [7] technology gap shares {￿n;tg1
n=￿1
satisfy (26)￿(27); [8] total productivity of the sectors with n-step gap Qd
n;t evolves according
to the innovation rates in (17) and (18);11 [9] the interest rate satis￿es the Euler equation (24);
[10] exhaustible resource quantity and price satisfy (4) and (25); [11] Rt evolves according to
the law of motion (3); and [12] St is given by (9) and (10) with Y d
t given by (23).
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
Our model has 18 parameters/variables, {￿, ￿ S, ￿, ’, ’0, ’P, ￿, ￿, ￿, R0, Ls, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, FI,
FE, ￿g, and the initial distribution of technology gaps between clean and dirty technologies,
f￿0;tg1
n=￿1, to be determined. As will become clearer below, given f￿0;tg1
n=￿1, the remaining
parameters can be estimated without knowledge of taxes and subsidies, and also without any
information on ￿ S;￿;’;’0, and ’P. These parameters become relevant only for our policy
analysis. Nevertheless, for completeness we also specify our choices for all these parameters.
We proceed in four steps. First, we choose from external sources the parameters of the
carbon cycle and the discount rate: ￿; ￿ S;￿;’;’0;’P;￿;￿ and ￿. Second, we directly estimate
Ls;￿; and ￿ from microdata. Third, we choose the initial distribution of technology gaps to
match the distribution of patents between ￿rms innovating primarily with clean and primarily
with dirty technologies as we explain below. Finally, we estimate the remaining parameters
￿;￿;R0;￿;FI and FE using simulated method of moments, with moments being selected to
model the ￿rm-level R&D behavior, growth rates, entry/exit rates for the energy sector as we
describe below, and from the time path of carbon emissions. The model performs well and is
able to replicate these moments reasonably closely.
11See the Online Appendix for the explicit equations for the evolution of quality indices.
16Throughout our focus is on the energy sector, the behavior of which has motivated our
theoretical model. The energy sector is de￿ned as ￿rms involved in the sourcing, re￿nement
and delivery of energy inputs for residential and industrial applications (e.g., oil and gas, elec-
tricity), ￿rms that provide complementary inputs and equipment into this energy-production
process (e.g., drilling equipment, power plant technologies), and ￿rms that interface with the
energy inputs for residential and industrial use (e.g., motor manufacturers). As such, the 1576
￿rms that make up our sample include oil and gas producers, mining and exploration ￿rms,
engine manufacturers, power companies building upon multiple techniques, energy equipment
manufacturers, and similar. The data we use for estimation come from the Census Bureau,
and we design our sample around innovative ￿rms in the energy sector that are in operation
during the 1975-2004 period.
3.1 External Calibration
We choose the parameters ￿ S;￿;’;’0;’P;￿ and ￿ to link our model to the carbon cycle and its
impact on aggregate output following Golosov et al.￿ s (2014) approach. This approach takes
into account the current level of carbon stock and its increase since pre-industrial times; the rate
at which new emissions enter the atmosphere, the terrestrial biosphere or shallow oceans, and
the deep oceans; how that movement and the various reservoirs of carbon in￿ uence the earth￿ s
temperature; and how higher temperatures and environmental damage hurt the economy. This
approach is similar to prior work in environmental economics (e.g., Nordhaus, 2008; Nordhaus
and Boyer, 2000), though with some important di⁄erences: in particular, it is more ￿ exible in
allowing non-linear absorption of atmospheric carbon, but it does not allow any delay on the
impact of this carbon content on economic outcomes and temperature changes (e.g., because
ocean temperature changes at a di⁄erent rate than land temperature) and does not separately
keep track of the dynamics of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O).
The value of the pre-industrial stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere ￿ S is 581 GtC
(gigatons of carbon). To model how emission increases the atmospheric stock of carbon,
we de￿ne the three parameters ’;’0; and ’P as follows. First, ’P is the portion of new
emissions that will remain in the atmosphere for a very long time, likely for thousands of
years, and estimates of this parameter from Archer (2005) and IPCC (2007) are about 20%.
The other two parameters, ’ and ’0, govern the short- and medium-term movement of the
emitted carbon, which in￿ uence the earth￿ s temperature over short horizons but are ultimately
absorbed into the deep oceans. To identify these parameters, we utilize the 30 year half-life
of carbon and match the carbon stock evolution under emissions during the 1900-2008 period.
We use the law of motion of the atmospheric carbon concentration St, given by (10), over the
period 1900-2008.12 The emission data, fKtg
2008
t=1900, are depicted in Figure 1.
12Namely, St =
R t￿1900
0 (1 ￿ dl)Kt￿ldl + S1900:
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Figure 1. World Carbon Emissions
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Figure 2. Atmospheric Carbon
Concentration: Data and Model
Implications
Figure 2 then shows the close ￿t of (10) at the parameter values ’ = 0:0313 and ’0 = 0:7661
(the blue line) to the actual data on atmospheric carbon concentration (the red dotted line).
As already noted, our damage function also follows Golosov et al. (2014) and we choose
the same ￿ parameter as they do, 5.3 x 10￿5 GtC￿1. Because this number may be too low, we
investigate the robustness of our results to higher values of ￿ in Section 6.
In addition, the ￿ parameter is chosen to link current world emissions levels to the baseline
level of dirty output in the model, Yd as given by (23), so that implied future increases in
Yd will translate to correspondingly higher levels of emissions. This formulation assumes that
both emissions and technological change in our model can proxy those in the global economy
(e.g., because new technologies can be utilized globally).13 For the elasticity parameter ￿ in
the dirty production function, we follow Golosov et al. (2014) and set ￿ = 0:04.
As noted above, the parameter ￿ allows for distortionary e⁄ects of research subsidies,
for example, because it is di¢ cult for the government to know ex ante which projects are
most worthy of public support. For instance, the US Department of Energy (DOE) provided
$6.3 billion in funding for the support of clean energy research and implementation projects,
and there have been some high-pro￿le business and technology failures associated with this
program (DOE, 2012). A well-known example is that of Solyndra Corporation, a solar panel
manufacturer, which received approximately $500 million in support from the DOE, before
declaring bankruptcy without achieving large-scale production. Motivated by this, we set our
baseline value for ￿ to 10% (implying that out of the $6.3 billion, $630 million would be entirely
wasted). We will show that our results are robust when ￿ is equal to 0% or 20%.
13This modeling strategy abstracts from several important issues: [1] carbon taxes and research subsidies vary
across countries, especially in view of the prevailing lack of international cooperation (see Hassler and Krusell,
2012, for possible implications of this), and [2] new technologies, often ￿rst developed in advanced economies
(in particular, the United States whose microdata we are using), will spread only slowly to other countries.
18The ￿nal piece of our external calibration is the (private and social) discount rate, which
we take as ￿ = 1%; close to the 1.5% chosen by Nordhaus. We also show that our results are
quite similar, but of course involve more aggressive policies, when the (social) discount rate is
0:1% as assumed by Stern (2007).
3.2 Sample Construction and Data Sources
We use the individual records of patents granted by the USPTO from 1975-2009. We collect
patents that are ￿led by inventors living in the United States at the time of the patent appli-
cation, and our assigned to industrial ￿rms. We identify patents related to the energy sector
through patent technology codes. The technology codes are the most disaggregated level of the
USPTO￿ s classi￿cation scheme and number over 150,000. We adopt the prior classi￿cations
developed by Popp (2002) and Popp and Newell (2012). This authoritative prior work is par-
ticularly helpful in that they provide classi￿cations into various types of energy technologies.
We are interested, however, in several technologies (e.g., nuclear power) not considered by
Popp and Newell (2012) and thus extend their list through three additional steps: [1] using
environment-related technologies identi￿ed by the OECD under the IPC system, [2] examining
patents made by prominent ￿rms with energy-related R&D data from the NSF R&D Survey,
and [3] manual searches on key phrases.
Our ￿rm-level operating data are from the US Census Bureau￿ s Longitudinal Business
Database, which contains annual employment levels for every private-sector establishment with
payroll from 1976 onward. We also employ Economic Censuses that are conducted every ￿ve
years to collect additional plant and ￿rm operation data (e.g., sales). We match patent data to
these operating data using ￿rm-name and geographic-location matching algorithms. We focus
our sample on the years in which Economic Censuses are conducted. This structure matches
our data￿ s features and accounts for the lumpiness of innovation outcomes. We thus mea-
sure variables using the average of observed values for ￿rms in ￿ve-year windows surrounding
Economic Census years and have six time periods covering 1975-2004.
Our third data source is the NSF￿ s Survey of Industrial Research and Development (R&D
Survey) that collects information from all ￿rms conducting over one million dollars in R&D
and subsamples ￿rms beneath this level. The R&D Survey provides us with information on
many ￿rms￿R&D expenditures and employments of science and engineering workers. We use
the data, along with the patenting of the ￿rm, to calculate the innovation production function
for the sector (e.g., the ￿ and ￿ parameters). These calculations only utilize ￿rm observations
for which we always observe reported data. For our broader moments on ￿rm dynamics, we
need a complete distribution that encompasses ￿rms only subsampled beneath the threshold.
Our patent data are universally observed, and we thus use patents to impute R&D values for
￿rms that are less than the threshold of one million dollars R&D and not subsampled. Overall,
our moments combine the R&D and patent data into a single measure of innovation (in R&D
19terms) that accords with the model.
Our sample requires that a ￿rm either patent or have measured R&D in the ￿rst period
of its life, and does not condition on innovative activity before 1975-1979 for ￿rms that are
present at the sample￿ s start. Because our model allows for ￿rms to transition out of R&D, we
include ￿rms that stop innovation, though we do not include non-innovative incumbent ￿rms
that switch to innovation.14 Our ￿nal sample requires the ￿rm have positive employment and
obtain three or more patents in the energy sector during 1975-2004. We also require that 10%
of the ￿rm￿ s total patenting be in energy-related ￿elds. The 10% bar is more substantial than
it may initially appear as we have been fairly conservative in terms of de￿ning energy-sector
patents.
Thus, our compiled dataset includes 6228 observations from 1576 innovative ￿rms in the
energy sector from 1975-2004. While focused on a single sector, our ￿rm-level panel contains
19% of all US R&D industrial expenditures and accounts for about 70% of industrial patents
for the U.S. energy sector. Across all activity in the economy, our sample contains 1% of
establishments, 5% of employment, and 10% of sales. Our sample accounts for a substantial
amount of activity in several of the main sectors responsible for emissions (e.g., Mueller et
al., 2011).15 While our sample does not include many ￿rms directly from two high-emission
sectors, agriculture and transportation, it includes many of the manufacturers of products that
are key inputs to these sectors.
We de￿ne patents as related to dirty technologies if they are connected to the extraction,
re￿nement or use of fossil-fuel based energy, including oil, coal, natural gas, and shale technolo-
gies. We group into clean-energy patents ￿elds that are related to geothermal, hydroelectric,
nuclear, solar, and wind energy. We also include patents for conservation and utilization of
energy. Results are robust to reclassi￿cations of border group types.
Finally, to determine the model￿ s initial conditions, we identify whether ￿rms are primarily
operating in dirty- or clean-energy applications. We ￿rst classify an observation (a ￿rm in a
given period) as focused on clean energy if 25% or more of its energy-sector patents are devoted
to clean-energy ￿elds; otherwise the ￿rm is classi￿ed as a dirty-energy ￿rm in the period. We
use the 25% threshold as our assignments of clean-energy ￿elds are conservative compared to
dirty-energy ￿elds. We then describe the ￿rm overall as a clean-energy ￿rm if half or more of its
time periods achieve this clean-energy focus. The distribution between clean and dirty uses at
the ￿rm level is fairly bimodal￿ 96% of observations have 75% or more of their patents in one
technology￿ making the exact details of these procedures less important. In total, 11% of our
14As the probability that an existing, non-innovative ￿rm commences R&D or patenting over the ensuing ￿ve
years (conditional on survival) is only about 1%, this exclusion is reasonable. These procedures de￿ne the base
pool of innovative ￿rms in the energy sector.
15In the 1992-1997 period, for example, we account for 59% of sales in industries related to coal and oil
extraction, re￿nement, and shipment; 33% of sales in industries related to electricity production; and 21% of
manufacturing sales. Among manufacturing industries, our sample contains higher shares in industries more
closely linked with emissions (e.g., 64% in petroleum re￿nement, 31% in primary metals).
20￿rms are classi￿ed in the clean-energy sub-sector; 14% of energy-sector patents are classi￿ed
as clean energy.
3.3 Estimation and Choice of Parameters from Microdata
We ￿rst estimate the ￿ parameter from our innovation production function, Xf =
￿(Hf)￿(uf)1￿￿, which can be rewritten as ln(X=uf) = ln(￿) + ￿ ￿ ln(H=uf). We measure
X by the ￿rm￿ s count of patents, H by the ￿rm￿ s R&D expenditures or scientist counts, and
u through four proxies of ￿rm size given below. Our patent count measure is weighted by
citations (normalized by the average citations achieved by other patents in the same patent
class and application year).
To estimate the ￿ elasticity as accurately as possible, we use the panel nature of our data
and later return to estimating the ￿ parameter. As noted earlier, we only use for this exercise
￿rms that have a full panel of reported R&D data. To focus on higher-quality data for our
di⁄erenced estimations, we also require that the ￿rm be present in at least three periods. We
￿rst estimate a linear regression with year ￿xed e⁄ects ￿t as follows:
ln(Patents=productf;t) = ￿ ￿ ln(R&D=productf;t) + ￿t + ￿f;t; (28)
with standard errors clustered by ￿rm. We then extend the estimation to allow for ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects by ￿rst-di⁄erencing to obtain the following speci￿cation:
￿ln(Patents=productf;t) = ￿ ￿ ￿ln(R&D=productf;t) + ￿t + ￿f;t: (29)
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes eight variants of the OLS levels regression (28). The rows
indicate four measures of ￿rm size uf: SIC3 industry counts, SIC4 industry counts, sales,
and establishment counts. Column headers indicate whether R&D inputs are being measured
through R&D expenditures or counts of scientists. The eight coe¢ cients are from eight separate
estimations of regression (28). The average is 0.69 with a range of 0.63-0.76.
Table 1. OLS Estimates for ￿ Parameter
A. Levels B. First-di⁄erenced
Firm Size uf: R&D Scientists R&D Scientists
SIC3 Counts 0.632 (0.042) 0.653 (0.048) 0.342 (0.056) 0.286 (0.052)
SIC4 Counts 0.625 (0.043) 0.644 (0.048) 0.353 (0.057) 0.296 (0.053)
Sales 0.761 (0.053) 0.751 (0.048) 0.405 (0.075) 0.348 (0.065)
Establishments 0.714 (0.039) 0.732 (0.041) 0.505 (0.058) 0.455 (0.054)
Note: This table presents variants of regressions (28) and (29). Standard errors in parentheses.
Panel B similarly summarizes eight estimation variants of the ￿rst-di⁄erenced regression (29).
The average across these variants is lower at 0.37, with a range of 0.29 to 0.51. We set the
baseline value of ￿ to 0.5, the mid-point within the range of estimates in Table 1.16
16We also ￿nd comparable ￿ parameters in robustness checks o⁄ of this sample platform. For example,
21We next turn to the ￿ parameter that describes technology leapfrogging. This process
is challenging to model empirically, and we are unfortunately unable to identify exact races
between clean and dirty technologies directly within the patent data. This limitation is due
to the narrowness of the technology codes that are entirely clean or dirty in application, while
patent class divisions are too broad and few in number. We thus identify the rate at which
patents with exceptional quality emerge using patent citations and quantify the rate at which
patents enter and quickly establish high levels of citations compared to incumbent peers.
Speci￿cally, we start with our dataset of all energy-sector patents granted to US inventors
during the post-1975 period. We calculate among these energy-sector patents the citation
count distribution of incumbent patents by year, excluding within-￿rm citations. Incumbent
patents are de￿ned to be those that were applied for 5-10 years before the focal year; we cap at
10 years prior so that we can have a stable window across a time period from 1985 onwards for
analysis. Citations are coming from patents being applied for in the focal year. By focusing
on patents receiving a citation in a given year, we are e⁄ectively looking at technologies that
are being actively used, with many incumbent patents dropping out as no one is building on
them. We then calculate for new patents the citations they receive by year. We designate a
major entrant as any patent that has a citation count that exceeds the 90th percentile of the
incumbent distribution in any of its ￿rst three years. This evaluation approach is designed
to keep the incumbent groups (5-10 years earlier) separate from the entrant groups (max of
three years earlier). 4.2% of entrants achieve this level of major entrant. We ￿nd a slightly
lower estimate at 4.0% using Popp and Newell￿ s (2012) de￿nitions, and a rate of 4.1% when
making the citation distributions speci￿c to each patent class. Based upon these ￿ndings, we
set ￿ = 4%.
Finally, for Ls, which is the supply of scientists and engineers involved in R&D-type ac-
tivities in the model (relative to unskilled workers), we use 5.5%. We calculate this share
from Census IPUMS using the 2000 5% sample, focusing on non-group quartered workers aged
20-65, employed in industries closely related to the energy sector. We also require 20 weeks
worked within the year and usual hours worked of 20 or more during each week. 5.5% is the
share of these workers with college education or more, employed in occupations related to
science and engineering.
restricting the sample to ￿rms with energy patents as more than 30% of their patent portfolio yields levels
and ￿rst-di⁄erences estimates of 0.744 (0.065) and 0.384 (0.100), respectively. Restricting our sample to ￿rms
identi￿ed from Popp and Newell￿ s (2012) codes yields levels and ￿rst-di⁄erences estimates of 0.704 (0.049) and
0.301 (0.071), respectively. Relaxing our requirement that the ￿rm be present in three periods yields levels and
￿rst-di⁄erences estimates of 0.614 (0.043) and 0.338 (0.056), respectively. We likewise ￿nd similar outcomes
when incorporating industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects, using unweighted patent counts, or similar adjustments. Finally,
the Online Appendix provides similar estimates from Poisson models that allow for zero patenting outcomes.
223.4 Initial Technology Gaps
To provide the initial distributions of the model, we develop estimates of the cumulative stock
of technologies invented by clean- and dirty-energy ￿rms using SIC3 industries as approxi-
mations of product lines. We develop these distributions in three steps. The ￿rst step is to
calculate the sum of patents by each ￿rm during the 1975-2004 period and the ￿rm￿ s distri-
bution of employment across SIC3 industries in these sectors over the same period. We then
apportion the ￿rm￿ s cumulative patent stock across SIC3 industries using the ￿rm￿ s employ-
ment distributions. For each SIC3 industry, we ￿nally sum the apportioned patents made by
clean- and dirty-energy ￿rms. This sum of patents across all ￿rms, active or inactive, re￿ ects
the quality ladders structure of our model.
These calculations provide us with over 400 estimates of comparative clean- and dirty-
energy stocks. Across these SIC3 industries, clean-energy ￿rms are estimated to have a higher
cumulative patent stock in 13.1% of industries. For data quality and Census Bureau disclosure
restrictions, we focus on the upper half of the industry distribution in terms of cumulative
clean and dirty patent counts, which has 13.0% of industries being led by the clean-energy
stock (within manufacturing and energy production speci￿cally, this share is 12.5%).
The average gap relative to the frontier in the 13% of cases where clean patents have the lead
is 39%, while it is 76% in the 87% of cases where dirty patents have the lead. We convert the
patent gaps into the technology gaps in the model using a conversion factor between the patents
rates in the data and the innovation rates in the model. In particular, in our model the annual
innovation ￿ ow of incumbents is 24:1% per product line (the sum of xc = 4:8% and xd = 19:3%),
while in the data the mean of patent ￿ ow is approximately 43 per line. Hence we divide the
empirical patent distribution of clean and dirty (which consists of patents registered between
1975-2004) by the conversion factor of 43=0:241, and then round the resulting technology to
the nearest integer. This gives us the initial number of improvements nd
j;0 and nc
j;0. We then
compute the initial productivities as qd
j;0 = ￿
nd
j;0 and qc
j;0 = ￿
nc
j;0 to provide the initialization
values.
Figure 3 plots the density of the resulting distribution of initial technology gaps between
dirty and clean technologies.17 It shows that in most product lines the dirty technology is only
a few steps ahead of clean technology, but there is a long tail of product lines with a large
gap between dirty and clean, and a small set in which clean is ahead of dirty. The fraction of
product lines with a non-zero gap in terms of step sizes is 90%. Clean energy leads by one or
more step sizes in 9% of cases. Dirty energy has a lead of 20 and 50 step sizes or more in 11%
17See the Online Appendix for additional summary statistics.
23and 2% of technologies, respectively. We later consider alternative initial distributions.
Figure 3. The distribution of initial productivity gaps between clean and dirty technologies
across product lines (a positive number indicates the dirty technology having the lead).
3.5 Simulated Method of Moments
The remaining parameters ￿;￿;FI; FE; R0 and ￿ are estimated using the quantitative im-
plications of our model. For the ￿rst four of these parameters, ￿;￿;FI and FE, we use
the simulated method of moments (SMM). This approach chooses the parameter vector
so as to minimize the distance between four moments as implied by our model and data,
min
P4
i=1 jmodel(i) ￿ data(i)j; where we index each moment by i: SMM iteratively searches
repeatedly across sets of parameter values for ￿;￿;FI and FE until the model￿ s moments are
as close as possible to the empirical moments (see Adda and Cooper, 2003, for further details).
We also choose the ￿xed cost heterogeneity parameter, ￿, as 10% and verify that our results
are not sensitive to this choice of parameter.
We use three moments from the microdata￿ ￿rm entry rates, ￿rm exit rates, and the
average R&D/sales ratio of ￿rms￿ together with the growth rate of the sector to identify
these parameters. The entrant￿ s labor share and exit rates are calculated across the ￿ve-year
intervals of our Census Bureau data and then transformed into annualized net rates of 1:3%
and 1:75%, respectively. We match the construction of these entry and exit rate moments
in the model. The weighted average R&D-to-sales ratio is 6:56%, using log sales as weights
and winsorizing the R&D/sales ratio at the 99th percentile to reduce outliers. The aggregate
annual sales growth per worker is 1:23% for the sector across the 1975-2004 period.18
For the remaining parameters, ￿ and R0, we use the implied emission path of our model. BP
(2010) reports that oil reserves are around 181.7 gigaton, but there is considerable uncertainty
around this estimate as well as on coal reserves. Rogner (1997) argues that world coal supplies
will be su¢ cient for several hundred years if used at the current rate. This motivates our
18The computational algorithm is described in the Online Appendix.
24approach of computing these two parameters to match the level and the growth rate of emissions
in 2008 (rather than using a speci￿c value of total reserves).
4 Estimation Results
In this section, we provide the SMM estimates of the remaining parameters and discuss the ￿t of
our model to non-targeted moments. Finally, we show how atmospheric carbon concentration,
temperatures and aggregate output evolve given these parameters in a laissez-faire equilibrium
(with no policy intervention) starting from the observed distribution of technology gaps.
4.1 Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit
Table 2 summarizes our parameter estimates. The estimate of ￿ = 0:958 implies that a unit of
skilled labor on a single product line generates an innovation with probability of approximately
24% per year. Our estimates of the innovation step size, ￿ = 1:063, implies a gross pro￿t
margin of 5:7%, which is reasonable. The model predicts a sizable ￿xed cost advantage for
incumbent ￿rms: their ￿xed cost of operation is equal to 5% of the entrants￿￿xed cost. Finally,
our procedure of matching the recent past of emissions delivers the total energy resources as
13;549 gigatons of carbon equivalent (GtC), which is reasonable given the extent of known
reserves.
Table 2. Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value Parameter Description Value
￿ Innovation productivity 0.958 FE Fixed cost of entry 0.040
￿ Innovation step size 1.063 R0 Total energy resources 13549
FI Fixed cost of R&D 0.002 ￿ Extraction technology 0.016
Note: This table presents the parameter estimates from SMM.
Table 3 shows the values of the moments used for estimation, which generally match the
data quite closely.
Table 3. Moment Matching
Moments Model Data Moments Model Data
Entry Share 0.014 0.013 Aggregate Sales/Worker Growth 0.012 0.012
Exit Rate 0.032 0.018 Emissions Level in 2008 8.461 8.749
Average R&D/Sales 0.065 0.066 Growth of Emissions in 2008 0.023 0.024
Note: This table compares the model and the data across the moments used for estimation.
.
Our main method of evaluating the quantitative ￿t of our model is to look at a range of
non-targeted moments, which are presented with the model implications in Tables 4A ￿ 4C.
We choose the non-targeted moments to represent aspects of the ￿rm size distribution and its
growth properties, which are quite di⁄erent from the moments we targeted in our estimation.
25Our ￿rst non-targeted moment compares the size ratio of the median entrant to the median
incumbent ￿rm. Our targeted moments on entry/exit rates, overall sector growth, and R&D
intensity do not directly impose strong constraints on this size distribution of ￿rms. Table 4A
contrasts the size ratios in the model and data with respect to employment, sales, and sales
per employee, and shows that our model implications match the data very closely with respect
to the latter two metrics, though not as well for employment.19
Table 4A. Entrant Size Ratio to Incumbents
Ratio of Median Sizes
Size Measure: Model Data
Employment 0.18 0.03
Sales 0.18 0.20
Sales per Employee 1.13 1.05
Note: This table compares non-targeted moments in the model and the data.
We next compare growth distributions. We ￿rst calculate the unconditional growth rate
of employment for each ￿rm in the model and data de￿ned as (Empt ￿ Empt￿1)=((Empt +
Empt￿1)=2). As argued by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), this measure of growth
has attractive properties like a symmetric treatment of positive and negative growth and
bounded values that minimize outliers. We calculate growth over ￿ve-year intervals. We
then calculate the probability that ￿rms experience substantial movements in either positive
or negative directions. Comparing these movements in the model to the data provides insights
into how well the innovation step sizes and associated ￿rm dynamics mirror the sector￿ s true
performance. Table 4B shows that the model matches the data quite well on this dimension.
The model somewhat overpredicts employment declines of 25% or more, but it closely matches
otherwise.
Table 4B. Comparison of Growth Distribution
Employment Growth Probability
Change over 5-Years: Model Data Change over 5-Years: Model Data
Decrease 75% or more 0.25 0.11 Increase 25% or more 0.26 0.31
Decrease 50% or more 0.30 0.15 Increase 50% or more 0.20 0.20
Decrease 25% or more 0.38 0.26 Increase 75% or more 0.17 0.14
Increase 100% or more 0.10 0.11
Note: This table compares non-targeted moments in model and data.
Finally, Table 4C turns to a comparison of the model and the data for growth rates of ￿rms
conditional on di⁄erent quartiles of the size distribution. For this exercise, we divide ￿rms into
quantiles based upon their initial size in each ￿ve-year period and then compute the growth
rates using the above formula. The employment distribution implied by the model is a little
less ￿ne-grained than the data, as about 50% of our ￿rms have one product and employment
19To pass Census Bureau disclosure restrictions, the empirical medians are ￿fuzzy￿median estimates that use
the average values over the 45th to 55th percentiles.
26is partially proportional to product counts. Nevertheless, the model￿ s implications match the
general patterns in the data, and in particular, the model successfully generates the lack of
growth in the top two quantiles compared to the bottom three. Overall, the model performs
reasonably well for these diverse tests, providing con￿dence in its ability to capture production
and innovation dynamics in the energy sector.
Table 4C. Comparison of Growth over Size Distribution
5-Year Conditional Growth Rates
Quantile of Sizes: Model Data Quantile of Sizes: Model Data
Smallest 29% 31% 3rd 26% 11%
2nd 38% 14% 4th -8% -1%
Largest -3% -10%
Note: This table compares non-targeted moments in model and data.
4.2 Climate Dynamics in the Laissez-faire Economy
We next describe the implied future equilibrium and atmospheric carbon paths of the model
under laissez-faire (meaning no carbon taxes and research subsidies). Given the initial distri-
bution of technology gaps, dirty innovation is more pro￿table and with no policy intervention,
most R&D is initially targeted to the dirty technology as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Innovation rates under
laissez-faire.
Figure 5. The time path of temperature
increases under laissez-faire.
Moreover, at these innovation rates, technology gaps and the pro￿tability of dirty technologies
increase relative to those of clean technologies, and clean R&D rapidly converges to zero.
Consequently, in the long run clean technologies disappear completely and dirty technologies
take over the entire economy.20 The obvious implication of this time path of innovations is a
20Note that this rapid disappearance of clean technologies does not con￿ ict with the initial conditions shown
in Figure 3, which had 9% of product lines being led by clean technology. This is because the current stock of
technologies is not generated by a laissez-faire equilibrium, but by one in which clean technologies receive R&D
subsidies as described in Section 5 and other protections (e.g., through pollution standards).
27steady increase in dirty energy production and carbon emissions. Figure 5 shows an increase
in temperature of an additional 11￿C in the next 200 years.21
5 Policy Analysis
In this section, we characterize the policies that maximize discounted welfare given our esti-
mated parameters and then consider various counterfactual policy experiments.
5.1 Optimal Policy
We start with optimal policy.22 Throughout, we do not allow the social planner to correct
for monopoly distortions, thus limiting ourselves to the policy instruments discussed above￿
carbon taxes and subsidies to clean research.23 In fact, our theoretical analysis makes it
clear that what is relevant is the di⁄erential tax and subsidy rates for clean vs. dirty energy,
motivating us to focus on taxes on dirty production, which we refer to as ￿carbon taxes,￿and
subsidies to clean innovation. Finally, for computational reasons, we model taxes and subsidies
as quartic functions of calendar time. The resulting optimal policies are presented in Figure 6
(with the research subsidy shown on the left axis and the carbon tax on the right axis).
Figure 6. Optimal policies (carbon taxes and research subsidies) under baseline parameters.
Figure 6 shows a very high level of research subsidy, especially during the ￿rst few decades.
The intuition for why optimal policy relies so much on subsidies to clean research is instructive.
The social planner would like to divert R&D from carbon-intensive dirty technologies towards
clean technologies. She can do so by choosing a su¢ ciently high carbon tax rate today and
21We compute temperature changes as ￿temperature = ￿
￿
lnSt ￿ ln ￿ S
￿
=ln2.
22Because of the non-linear dynamics of atmospheric carbon concentration, optimal policy is not necessarily
time-consistent. We ignore this problem by assuming that the social planner is able to commit to the future
sequence of taxes and subsidies.
23As mentioned above, in the one-sector version of our model (either with only dirty or only clean technology),
taxes or subsidies to research would only a⁄ect relative wages of skilled workers (employed in the research sector),
and crucially not the aggregate rate of innovation. For this reason, subsidies to clean research or taxes on dirty
research are identical in our model.
28in the future, as this would reduce the pro￿tability of production using dirty technologies and
secure both a switch to clean production and, on the basis of this, to research directed at clean
technologies. However, this is socially costly because given the current state of technology,
switching most production to clean technology has a high consumption cost (because the
marginal costs of production of clean technologies are initially signi￿cantly higher than those
of dirty technologies). Hence, the social planner prefers to use the carbon tax to only deal with
the carbon emission externality and to rely on the research subsidy to redirect R&D towards
clean technologies. Figure 7 shows that the research subsidy is indeed su¢ cient to rapidly
switch innovation from the dirty to clean technology.
Figure 7. Innovation rates under optimal
policies.
Figure 8. The time path of temperature
increases under optimal policies.
Figure 6 also shows that while the optimal research subsidy is front-loaded, the optimal
carbon tax is hump-shaped. It starts out very low and increases gradually over the ￿rst 130
years to almost 90%, and then declines back down to zero by about year 180. This is also
intuitive: the research subsidy is front-loaded because the social planner would like to switch
research towards the clean technology as soon as possible. Once this is achieved and the change
in the distribution of technology gaps makes clean research su¢ ciently pro￿table, the research
subsidy is phased out. Given the research subsidy, which is highly e⁄ective in redirecting
technological change, the planner initially sets a low carbon tax so as not to excessively distort
early consumption. The carbon tax is raised over time, which re￿ ects two forces; (i) future
distortions are less costly to the social planner because of discounting; (ii) as clean technologies
improve, the distortionary e⁄ects of the carbon tax are reduced. Finally, as most production
switches to the clean technology, there is less need for the carbon tax, and it is phased out.24
24The path of optimal research subsidy and carbon tax here are fairly similar to that in Acemoglu et al.
(2012), despite the fact that the details of the two models and the exact distortions that the carbon tax creates
are quite di⁄erent. In particular, the di⁄erent production structure here implies that a carbon tax creates no
29Figure 8 depicts the implied path of temperature under the optimal policy. The combination
of the research subsidy and the carbon tax keeps the temperature increase below 2 degrees,
and in fact, the temperature starts reverting down after about 40 years. This re￿ ects both
the switch of technological change to clean technologies and the role of the carbon tax in
discouraging the use of existing dirty technologies.
5.2 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
We next investigate the welfare and climatic implications of a range of alternative policies. We
￿rst focus on two counterfactuals. The ￿rst concerns the choice of an optimal policy relying
only on a carbon tax (i.e., no research subsidy), and the second involves delaying intervention
for 50 years and then choosing the optimal policy from that point onwards. The optimal
policies are presented in Figure 9.
(A) (B)
Figure 9. Constrained optimal policies following a 50-year delay
and the restriction to only carbon taxes
Panel A shows that optimal policy becomes more aggressive when the only policy tool
is the carbon tax. The carbon tax in this case starts out higher than in the baseline and
continues to increase to above 300%, though it still has a hump-shaped form and declines after
about 150 years, coming down to below 200% around year 200 as is visible at the end of the
200-year window shown in the ￿gure. The much higher level of the carbon tax in this case is
because this policy tool is being used not just to reduce current emissions but also to redirect
innovation towards clean technologies. An interesting implication of this constrained policy
distortion unless it induces some intermediates to switch to clean technology. This means that when there are
few intermediates remaining with the dirty technology, the bene￿ts from a carbon tax are low, but so are the
costs, as we show analytically in the Online Appendix. Nevertheless, along the path induced by that optimal
policy, the fraction of product lines using the dirty technology falls below 1% in 100 years, thus signi￿cantly
reducing the role of carbon taxes thereafter and accounting for the decline of the carbon tax to zero in about
180 years.
30is that aggregate temperature increases less at long horizons because of the more aggressive
carbon tax, but this is at the expense of slower consumption growth, especially early on. As
a result, the welfare cost of just relying on carbon tax for optimal policy (in terms of an
equivalent loss of initial consumption) is 1:9%.
Somewhat paradoxically, delaying the start of optimal policies by 50 years leads to less
aggressive policies from that point onwards. This is because the intervening interval has
generated a bigger technology gap between the clean and dirty sectors, making a rapid switch
from dirty to clean technologies thereafter undesirable (the switch now takes place in about
300 years). Because the economy now generates greater consumption early on, the welfare loss
from this 50-year delay is a relatively modest 1:7%.25
A related counterfactual is to focus on time-invariant policies. Under this restriction, the
optimal research subsidy and carbon tax are 63% and 13%; respectively. The welfare loss from
using time-invariant policies is also relatively modest, just 1%, which in part re￿ ects the fact
that once the switch to clean technology has taken place, keeping the research subsidy and the
carbon tax high only have moderate costs.
Finally, we also evaluate climatic and welfare implications of maintaining current US poli-
cies (here interpreted for the whole world) relative to adopting the optimal policy. For this
purpose, we have tried to estimate the carbon taxes implied by US policies and the current
subsidies to clean innovation (relative to dirty R&D) in our sample of ￿rms. There is much
uncertainty about what the carbon tax in the United States will be moving forward. A cap-
and-trade program is likely to be implemented, but it is unclear what the implied carbon tax
rate will be. Greenstone et al. (2013) estimate a social cost of carbon equal to about $21
in 2010, expressed in 2007 dollars, and this number is currently being used for cost-bene￿t
analysis by US agencies. Because future emissions are expected to become more harmful, this
social cost estimate is forecasted to increase to $45 in 2050 (in $2007). We therefore use two
values for the ￿business-as-usual￿carbon tax, 0% consistent with the current situation, and
23% (consistent with a $45 social cost of carbon in 2050).26 We estimate the current clean
research subsidy from our sample as follows: over our full 30-year period, 49% of all R&D
expenditures by our clean ￿rms are federally funded, while the same number is 11% for our
dirty ￿rms. This implies a 43% ((1 ￿ 0:49)=(1 ￿ 0:11) ’ 1 ￿ 0:43) subsidy for clean R&D
relative to dirty R&D.
Because a 43% research subsidy for clean is insu¢ cient to redirect technological change
towards clean with no carbon tax, the scenario with a zero carbon tax involves rapid increases
25If we increase ￿ to ￿ve times its baseline value (as we do in our robustness checks below) so that the damages
from not reducing carbon emissions become much higher, then policies following a 50-year delay are indeed more
aggressive than the baseline and the cost of delaying intervention is signi￿cant (about 12.5%).
26In particular, US carbon emissions are 1.58 billion tons in 2002. One metric ton of carbon is equivalent to
3.667 units of carbon dioxide. Our dirty ￿rms have sales of approximately one trillion dollars in this year. The
$45 social cost is $39 in 2002 terms. These numbers imply a real tax rate in 2050 of about 23% ((39 ￿ 3:667 ￿
1:58 ￿ 10
9)=10
12 ’ 0:23). This carbon tax rate is much less than currently used in Sweden (see Golosov et al.
2014) and also less than the numbers suggested by Nordhaus (2008).
31in temperature in the ￿rst several hundred years and leads to close to 100% welfare costs (re-
gardless of the discount rate). Interestingly, however, even with this less than optimal subsidy
to clean research, it turns out that the temperature increase can be contained provided that
there is a moderate carbon tax of 23%. In fact, because this (suboptimally low) combination of
research subsidy and carbon tax is still su¢ cient to induce a rapid switch to clean technology,
the welfare loss is only 1:2%.
6 Robustness and Extensions
In this section, we investigate how our estimation, optimal policy, and counterfactual results are
a⁄ected by a range of di⁄erent approaches, modeling assumptions, and variations on parameter
estimates. We economize on space by only reporting the implied optimal policies, even when
the variation in question involves reestimation. Overall, we ￿nd that our main conclusions,
especially those concerning the form of optimal policies, are fairly robust across these variations.
6.1 Three-Step Policy
The ￿rst robustness exercise considers policies that take a simple ￿step function form￿with
three endogenously determined switch points rather than optimal policies modeled as a quartic
in time.
The optimal policies in this case are depicted in Figure 10, which shows a similar pattern
to Figure 6, except that the carbon tax now remains high for a longer interval, coming down
only after about 440 years. We therefore conclude that the speci￿c computation restrictions
we imposed in our baseline analysis are not particularly important for our main conclusions.
Figure10. Optimal policies restricted to a three-step form.
6.2 Lower Social Discount Rate
An important debate in the optimal climate policy literature concerns the social discount rate.
Here we follow Stern (2007) and investigate the implications of lower social discount rates, in
32particular, ￿ = 0:5% and 0:1% (while still keeping the private discount rate at 1% so that
the implied interest rate is not counterfactually low). Figure 11 shows that with 0.5%, the
qualitative features of the optimal policy are very similar to our baseline, though the carbon
tax now increases to somewhat higher levels.
With the much lower social discount rate of 0.1%, the carbon tax rises much more rapidly
to much higher levels so as to cut emissions immediately (since these emissions create persistent
costs in the future, which the social planner now cares much more about). But even in this
case, the carbon tax has a hump-shaped path, and starts coming down after 150 periods.
Overall, we read the patterns in Figure 11 as suggesting that our qualitative, and to some
degree quantitative, conclusions are fairly robust to reasonable variations in social discount
rate.
(A) (B)
Figure 11. Optimal policies under a social discount rate of 0.5% and 0.1%.
6.3 Alternative Speci￿cations of Carbon Emissions
Our model considers emissions that are proportional to the use of dirty output. An alternative
is to assume that emissions are proportional to the amount of exhaustible resource used in dirty
production as in Golosov et al. (2014). As noted in footnote 10, this amounts to assuming
that even technological changes in the dirty sector reduce emissions per unit of energy output.
As in Golosov et al. (2014), this would not generate enough emissions to make the climate
change implications su¢ ciently costly. We therefore follow their paper in this case and assume
that, in addition to having emissions proportional to the use of the exhaustible resource, there
is also technological change reducing the cost of extracting the exhaustible resource by 2% a
year. Figure 12 shows that the qualitative features of the optimal policy are similar to our
baseline in this case, with the only exception that the carbon tax now increases to signi￿cantly
higher levels and comes down only after about 500 years.
Figure 13 shows that if we eliminate the exhaustible resource entirely (so that we have
33￿ = 0 in the above model and the production function of the dirty sector in (2) simpli￿es to
yd
i;t = qd
i;tld
i;t), the pattern of the optimal policy in this case is very similar to our baseline.
Figure 12. Optimal policies when emissions are
caused by the use of the exhaustible resource.
Figure 13. Optimal policies when dirty
production does not use the exhaustible
resource.
6.4 Alternative Damage Elasticity ￿
As noted above, actual damages from atmospheric carbon may be greater than the estimates
commonly used in the economics literature. We now show the sensitivity of our results to
higher values of these damages, captured by the parameter ￿, in our model. We consider two
cases: ￿rst, where ￿ is twice as large as our baseline value of ￿ = 5:3￿10￿5, and second, where
￿ is ￿ve times as large as the baseline.
(A) (B)
Figure 14. Optimal policies under alternative economic damage scenarios.
34Optimal policies are also similar when ￿ is twice as large as the baseline, with the only
di⁄erence being that the carbon tax now increases to a higher level (about 200%) within
the ￿rst 150 years, before declining towards zero again. When ￿ is raised to ￿ve times the
baseline, the qualitative pattern is also similar and involves a front-loaded research subsidy and
a hump-shaped path for the carbon tax, though the carbon tax now increases to much higher
levels before starting to decline. We conclude that the heavy reliance of the optimal policy on
research subsidies for the clean sector is robust to a fairly wide range of damage elasticities.
6.5 Varying the Distortions from Research Subsidies ￿
We next investigate the robustness of our results to scenarios in which research subsidies create
no distortions (￿ = 0%) or create twice as large distortions as in the baseline model (￿ = 20%).
Without any additional distortions from the use of the research subsidy, optimal policy relies
more heavily on this instrument, and the carbon tax increases less rapidly (and because it
ramps up slowly, it also starts declining later, after about 540 years). With signi￿cantly higher
distortions from the use of the research subsidy (20%), the form of the optimal policy is
remarkably similar to the baseline, with only slightly higher carbon tax rates. Overall, these
results imply that one of our main conclusions, the heavy reliance of optimal policy on research
subsidies, is quite robust to reasonable distortions from such subsidies.
(A) (B)
Figure 15. Optimal policies under di⁄erent assumptions on the research subsidy distortions.
6.6 Alternative R&D Elasticities ￿
Our baseline results are for ￿ = 0:50, which averaged across cross-sectional and ￿rst-di⁄erence
estimates. In Figure 16, we reestimate the model using ￿rst a value of ￿ in the ballpark of the
cross-sectional estimates (￿ = 0:65) and then for a value corresponding to the ￿rst-di⁄erence
estimates (￿ = 0:35), and investigate the implications of this for optimal policy.
35The resulting optimal policies are again similar to the baseline, except that with ￿ = 0:35,
because research more heavily relies on the past stock of knowledge, redirecting technological
change towards the clean sector is somewhat less e⁄ective, and the social planner makes heavier
use of the carbon tax (which increases to 530% in the ￿rst 200 years, coming down only after
about 390 years). When ￿ = 0:65, the optimal policy is very similar to the baseline.
(A) (B)
Figure 16. Optimal policies under alternative R&D elasticities.
6.7 Alternative Leapfrogging Probabilities ￿
We also investigate the implications of lower and higher leapfrogging rates (￿ = 0:03 and 0:05).
Figure 17 shows that the results are very similar to the baseline, with the only noteworthy
di⁄erence being that with ￿ = 0:03, the slower rate of leapfrogging increases the reliance on
the carbon tax slightly, leading to a somewhat higher peak (around 140%) for the optimal
carbon tax schedule.
(A) (B)
Figure 17. Optimal policies under alternative leapfrogging probabilities.
366.8 Alternative Initial Technology Distribution
Finally, we consider a variation on the initial technology distribution. We compute an alter-
native initial technology gap distribution with three modi￿cations: [1] we weight patents by
their normalized citation counts; [2] we consider four-digit (SIC4) industries, and [3] we focus
on the manufacturing and energy sectors. There are 332 SIC4 industries that are of su¢ cient
size to pass disclosure restrictions, and 9.4% are led by the clean technologies.27 Figure 18
shows that the optimal policy is again very similar to the baseline.
Figure 18. Optimal policies under alternative initial technology distributions.
Overall, the robustness exercises presented in this section show that the qualitative, and even
quantitative, patterns of optimal policy, including the heavy reliance on research subsidies, are
fairly robust.
7 Conclusion
One of the central challenges facing the world economy is reducing carbon emissions, which
appears to be feasible only if a successful transition to clean technology is induced. This paper
has investigated the nature of a transition to clean technology theoretically and empirically. We
developed a microeconomic model where clean and dirty technologies compete in production
and innovation. If dirty technologies are more advanced to start with, the potential transition
to clean technology can be di¢ cult both because clean research must climb several steps
to catch up with dirty technology and because this gap discourages research e⁄ort directed
towards clean technologies. We estimated our key model parameters from ￿rm-level microdata
in the US energy sector, using regression analysis and SMM. Our model performs fairly well
in matching a range of patterns in the data that were not directly targeted in the estimation,
giving us con￿dence that it is useful for the analysis of the transition to clean technology in
the US energy sector.
27Additional moments of this distribution are provided in the Online Appendix.
37Theoretically, carbon taxes and research subsidies encourage production and innovation in
clean technologies. The key question we investigate using our estimated quantitative model
is the structure and time path of optimal policies, how rapidly they will be able to secure
a transition to clean technology and slow down the potential increases in temperatures, and
what the costs of alternative, non-optimal policies are.
A natural intuition would be that only carbon taxes should be used because the key exter-
nalities in this model are created by carbon (in the absence of these carbon externalities, the
social planner would have no reason to interfere with or subsidize research). In contrast to this
intuition, we ￿nd that optimal policy heavily relies on research subsidies, and this result is very
robust across a range of variations and for di⁄erent damages and social discount rates. We also
use the model to evaluate the welfare consequences of a range of alternative policy structures.
For example, just relying on carbon taxes or delaying intervention both have signi￿cant welfare
costs.
Though, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst attempt to develop a microeconomic
model of the transition to clean technology and to quantitatively characterize optimal policy in
such a setup, our paper has inevitably left several questions unanswered and taken a number of
shortcuts, all of which constitute interesting areas for future research and investigation. We list
some of these that we view as particularly important here. First, we have abstracted both from
cross-country variation in policies and from the endogenous speed of clean technology transfer
across countries, which is likely to be central for the future of climate change and for the
structure of optimal policy. Second and related, we have also abstracted from game-theoretic
interactions in emissions, policies and technology choice across several countries in the global
economy, which become important when multiple countries individually choose their policies
(e.g., Harstad, 2012; Dutta and Radner, 2006). Third, we have followed the literature in this
area in ignoring non-linear threshold e⁄ects in the impact of atmospheric carbon on economic
e¢ ciency. Incorporating such non-linearities, together with an explicit approach to uncertainty
along the lines of Weitzman (2009), would be an important area for future research. Fourth,
as noted above, our optimal policies are characterized under the assumptions of commitment
to the policy sequence by the social planner. A major next step is to characterize time-
consistent optimal policy in the absence of perfect commitment. Fifth, another interesting
area is to investigate the interactions between international trade, technology and emissions
(see Hemous, 2012). Finally, our framework can also be augmented by considering a richer set
of possible technological improvements, including those that enable expansions in the stock of
exhaustible resources and technologies, such as carbon sequestration, that reduce the climatic
damage from dirty technologies.
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42Online Appendix
A-1 Proofs and Additional Theoretical Results
A-1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (15) into (14), we obtain
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This can further be simpli￿ed to
rt
Xu
i=1 v
j
ni;t ￿
Xu
i=1 _ v
j
ni;t ￿
Xu
i=1 v
j
ni;tgY;t
=
Xu
i=1
"
~ ￿j
ni ￿ zjv
j
ni;t+
z￿j
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + I(n
j
i￿0)￿
￿￿
v
j
n￿1;t ￿ v
j
ni;t
￿
+ I(n
j
i>0)z￿j￿
￿
v
j
￿1;t ￿ v
j
ni;t
￿
#
+
Z
max
xj￿0
￿
ujxj￿ v
j
t ￿
￿
1 ￿ s
j
I
￿
uj ~ ws
￿
￿
xj￿ 1
￿ ￿
￿ 1
￿ + I(xj>0)FI
￿￿
dFI:
where
~ ws ￿
ws
Y
and ~ ￿ =
￿
Y
:
De￿ning ~ rt ￿ rt ￿ gY;t delivers the desired result.
A-1.2 The Evolution of Quality Distributions
The quality indices in dirty sectors evolve according to following ￿ ow equations:
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The ￿rst line expresses the change in the quality index of sectors with n > 1: When there is
a new dirty innovation in sector with n ￿ 1 at the rate zd
t ; on average its quality is improved
A-1by a multiplicative factor ￿: Likewise, when there is a new incremental clean innovation at the
rate (1 ￿ ￿)zc
t in sectors with n + 1; they enter into state n. Finally, there is an out￿ ow from
state n through clean or dirty innovations that occur at the rate zt. The other lines represent
the ￿ ow equations for state n￿1; n = 0 and n < 0 respectively. Similar ￿ ow equations can be
expressed for clean technologies as follows:
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A-1.3 Optimal Constant Policy
To develop an intuition about the nature of optimal policy, we now consider a simpli￿ed optimal
policy problem. In particular, we abstract from dynamics and from the exhaustible resource,
and assume that the dirty output enters linearly into the production function, so that
lnY =
Z 1
0
lnyidi ￿ ￿
Z 1
0
yd
i di: (A-1)
This implies that the objective of the social planners to maximize net output. In the absence
of the exhaustible resource, the unskilled labor market clearing condition becomes
1 =
Z 1
0
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idi +
Z 1
0
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i di:
De￿ne
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qd
i
qc
i
:
Let us rank sectors from 0 to 1 with ascending xi, and also for ease of exposition, let us make
the following assumptions:
1. xi￿ s distribution F is continuous and di⁄erentiable with density f,
2. all sectors charge a markup of ￿.
Production is linear and satis￿es yi = q
j
il
j
i, depending on which j 2 fd;cg is used. Further-
more, let us also normalize qd
i = 1. We can order the product lines by xi and de￿ne the cuto⁄
to be ￿, which will be a function of the tax ￿, so that we can rewrite (A-1) as
lnY = ￿
Z 1
￿
lnxidi +
Z ￿
0
lnld
i di +
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lnlc
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| {z }
￿L
￿ ￿Y d: (A-2)
A-2Note that the marginal product line can be de￿ned as
x￿ = 1 + ￿ and ￿ = 1 ￿ F (1 + ￿): (A-3)
In addition, noting that all dirty sectors will use the same labor and all clean sectors will use
the same labor, and taking into account the impact of the carbon tax on dirty labor demand,
we have
ld =
1
￿ + (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
and lc =
1 + ￿
￿ + (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
:
Now we can show that
L = ￿ln
1
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1 + ￿
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Likewise
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:
Let us assume that
F (x) = 1 ￿
1
x
:
Then from (A-3) we get the fraction of dirty sectors as
￿ =
1
1 + ￿
and the total sum of the dirty output in (23)
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Now the objective function can be expressed as
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The ￿rst-order condition of the maximization problem is
￿
(1 + ￿)
2 ￿
(1 + ￿)
2 ￿ 1
(1 + ￿)[1 + (1 + ￿)￿]
+ ￿
1 + 2￿
[1 + (1 + ￿)￿]
2 = 0
This can be expressed as
￿ =
￿ [1 + (1 + ￿)￿]
(1 + ￿)
2 ￿ ￿(￿)
Note that ￿(0) = 0 and lim￿!1 ￿(￿) = 1: Note also that ￿(￿) is monotonically increasing
in ￿: Hence from intermediate value theorem the optimal tax rate ￿￿ (￿) exists and it is unique.
Moreover, the optimal tax rate is increasing in the damage parameter ￿:
A-3A-2 Computational and Estimation Algorithms
A-2.1 Computational Algorithm
Our theoretical analysis shows that the key microeconomic decisions are independent of climate
dynamics. We therefore solve for value functions, innovation rates, and distributions ￿rst,
then use those to ￿nd the time path for the carbon stock, temperature, and other variables of
interest.
The solution algorithm for this model involves ￿nding the transition dynamics as the ￿xed
point of a forward-backward iteration process, as in Conesa and Krueger (1998). To compute
this ￿xed point, we ￿rst update the product line distribution (￿) in the forward direction and
the value functions (V j) in the backward direction, using the long-term (clean) steady state
as the terminal condition.
For the estimation, we simulate a large panel of 16,384 ￿rms, each with an evolving port-
folio of product lines with various technological leads (n). After a lengthy burn-in time, we
then sample the targeted statistics in order to ￿nd the best ￿t parameters. We use standard
optimization routines to compute optimal policies. When focusing on constant policies, we use
a straightforward grid search to ￿nd the optimum. In the time-varying case, we parameterize
policies using a quartic carbon tax and a quartic research subsidy. We then search over this
space of functions using a combination of a simple simulated annealing algorithm (Kirkpatrick
et al., 1983) and a Nelder-Mead (simplex) algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965).
To solve for the ￿xed point of the sequence of value functions, we ￿rst discretize time into
N = 2048 steps and set a terminal period T = 2000. Due to the symmetry between technology
types inherent in this model, when a single type of technology is dominant￿ in the sense that
the technology gap distribution is heavily skewed to either clean or dirty technology￿ one can
analytically characterize value functions v
j
n;1 and innovation rates x
j
1 and z
j
1. We use these
values as terminal conditions, though we do not know in advance which technology (clean or
dirty) will be dominant. In addition, we set large upper (100) and lower (￿100) bounds on
the step gap distribution space. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Posit an initial guess for the value function at time zero of the form
v
j
n;t(0) =
￿
j
n
￿ + ￿ z
8t;
where ￿ z represents an estimated rate of creative destruction (we use ￿ z = 0:15). Instantiate
the technology gap distribution using the patent data with
￿n;t(0) = ￿n;0 8t:
2. Iterate forward in time from t = 0 to t = T by ￿nding innovation rates x
j
t and z
j
t given
value function and product distributions guesses at time t + 1, v
j
n;t+1(k) and ￿n;t+1(k).
A-4Using these innovation rates, update the time t + 1 product distribution ￿n;t+1(k + 1)
using discrete time versions of the ￿ ow equations in (27).
3. Find the implied dominant technology at the terminal period by determining which
technology type has a higher aggregate innovation rate as some late stage period T ￿TP
(we use TP = 200). Use the corresponding terminal value functions to update v
j
n;T(k +
1) = v
j
n;1.
4. Iterate backward in time from t = T to t = 0 by updating value function v
j
n;t￿1(k + 1)
using v
j
n;t(k) and ￿n;t(k) according to a discretized version of the HJB equation in Lemma
1, re-solving for innovation rates x
j
t and z
j
t in the process.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until the convergence criterion
max
n;t
￿
￿ ￿v
j
n;t(k + 1) ￿ v
j
n;t(k)
￿
￿ ￿ < "
is met. We use " = 10￿6.
In order to avoid any instability, particularly when one is close to a threshold where the as-
ymptotically dominant technology switches over, we also introduce heterogeneity in incumbent
￿xed costs as explained in the text.28
Using up-to-date computer hardware, the equilibrium solver takes anywhere from ￿ve sec-
onds to two minutes, depending on the speed of convergence. The code is written mostly in
Python, with core routines written in C/C++.
Finally, in our of policy analysis, we approximate optimal research subsidies and carbon
taxes as quartic functions of time. In Section 6, we verify that the qualitative patterns are
similar when we approximate these policies by step functions.
A-2.2 Estimation Algorithm
To ￿nd the moments used in the SMM estimation,29 we simulate a panel of 16;384 ￿rms
using equilibrium variables from the above model solving routine. Each ￿rm has a portfolio of
product lines with various technology gap values. We cap the maximum number of product
lines a ￿rm can have at 200. In order to determine the sales and R&D activity of the ￿rm, we
must keep track of both the number of product lines it is currently operating in, as well as the
knowledge stock of the ￿rm, which can in general di⁄er. We simulate this panel of ￿rms for 5
years to replicate the data generating process, and discretize time to have 100 subperiods per
year, so that the simulations have 500 periods.
28A similar heterogeneity can be introduced in entrant ￿xed costs, but because entrants are never in the
region where this heterogeneity matters, this makes no di⁄erence to our numerical procedures.
29McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) characterize the statistical
properties of the SMM estimator.
A-5A-3 Further Details on Data and Sample Construction
Our patent database was ￿rst developed by the NBER and was subsequently extended by HBS
Research to include patenting in recent years. Each patent record provides information about
the invention and the inventors submitting the application. Hall et al. (2001) provide extensive
details about these data, and Griliches (1990) surveys the use of patents as economic indicators
of technology advancement. Our focus is on industrial assignees with inventors in United States.
In a representative year, 1997, this group comprised about 77,000 patents (about 40% of the
total USPTO patent count in 1997). We focus on technology codes, that number of 150,000,
given the broad nature of patent classes (about 450 groups). This is important as energy-sector
patents are spread out over multiple patent classes￿ two examples related to solar energy are
￿Power Plants/utilizing natural heat/Solar￿and ￿Stoves and Furnaces/Solar heat collector￿ .
Moreover, we use patenting technologies to classify ￿rms as being primarily clean- or dirty-
energy ￿rms. This separation can only be done at the technology level as the patent class
level includes both types (e.g., ￿Power Plants￿includes technologies for coal-powered plants
too). As a representative year, 1997, our energy-related patents comprised 7.6% of the total
US patent count.
Our classi￿cations follow closely Popp (2002) and Popp and Newell (2012), and we report
results for our key parameters that just use their classi￿cation system. When seeking to extend
their work, we use three steps. We ￿rst utilize resources from the OECD￿ s work to identify
environment-related technologies. OECD (2011) lists such technologies using the International
Patent Classi￿cation (IPC) scheme, which some observers believe is better designed to identify
and group environment-related technologies than the USPTO classi￿cation framework. We
use concordances between the IPC and USPTO framework to identify additional technologies
to be included. We next use information on energy-related R&D data from the NSF R&D
Survey. For the ￿rms identi￿ed in this survey to be conducting energy-related R&D, we list
their patent technology codes and frequency. We then manually search the 600 most-frequent
codes to identify if they are energy related. In a related ￿nal step, we also manually search the
USPTO database using key words like ￿Coal￿and ￿Solar￿to determine relevant technologies.
This identi￿cation process constructs a pool of patents related to the energy sector.30
We match the patent data to these operating data using ￿rm-name and geographic-location
matching algorithms. The basic concept in these algorithms is to identify Census Bureau ￿rms
that have similar names to USPTO patent assignees and that have establishments in the same
geographic area as where inventors of the patents are located.31 This linkage also accomplishes
30Energy-related patents account for 5%-15% of US patents over our sample period, with a declining share
in recent years; in absolute terms, patent counts for the energy sector are stable or growing throughout the
period. The declining share is partly due to the sector not growing as fast as others, and partly due to external
changes over time to allow for patents to be made in sectors that traditionally did not patent, especially software
patents.
31The algorithms are described in detail in an internal Census Bureau report by Ghosh and Kerr (2010). This
patent matching builds upon the prior work of Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) and Kerr and Fu (2008).
A-6a related step of aggregating patent assignees to ￿rms, as some ￿rms ￿le patents through mul-
tiple patent assignee codes. This aggregation is due to the Census Bureau￿ s establishment-￿rm
hierarchy, as we observe establishment-level names within multi-unit ￿rms that help identify
subsidiaries and major corporate restructurings like mergers and acquisitions, and through the
name-matching process that consolidates slight name variants over patent assignees.
We focus our sample on the years in which Economic Censuses are conducted, speci￿cally
every ￿ve years starting in 1977 and ending in 2002. We adopt this focus for several reasons:
[1] the operating data are often best measured around these years due to heightened Census
Bureau resources, [2] some speci￿c variables from the Economic Censuses are only available
at those ￿ve-year marks, and [3] our innovation data are most appropriately considered over
short time periods. The third rationale is due, for example, to lumpiness in ￿rm applications
for patents; our R&D expenditures data are also often collected biannually. We thus measure
variables using the average of observed values for ￿rms in ￿ve-year windows surrounding these
Economic Census years (e.g., 1985-1989 for the 1987-centered period).
The R&D Survey is the US government￿ s primary instrument for surveying the R&D ex-
penditures and innovative e⁄orts of US ￿rms. This is an annual or biannual survey conducted
jointly by the Census Bureau and NSF (it is biannual for most of our sample period). The
survey includes with certainty all public and private ￿rms, as well as foreign-owned ￿rms,
undertaking over a minimum threshold of R&D expenditure in the United States. For most
of our sample period, this expenditure threshold is one million dollars of R&D within the US.
The survey frame also sub-samples ￿rms conducting less than the certain expenditure thresh-
old. These micro-records begin in 1972 and provide the most detailed statistics available on
￿rm-level R&D e⁄orts. In 1997, 3,741 ￿rms reported positive R&D expenditures that sum to
$158 billion. Foster and Grim (2010) and Akcigit and Kerr (2010) discuss these data in greater
detail.
When calculating our innovation production function for the sector (e.g., the ￿ and ￿
parameters), we only utilize ￿rm observations for which we always observe reported data on
R&D expenditures or scientist counts￿ meaning that these calculations use only ￿rms that
conduct more than the minimum threshold of one million dollars in R&D or are sub-sampled
completely. While this might present an issue for sectors like consumer internet start-ups, this
is not very restrictive for the supply side of the energy sector given the large amounts of R&D
expenditures required by many start-ups. For our broader moments on ￿rm dynamics, this
minimum threshold creates a challenge, however, for the consistent calculation of the entry
margin and growth rates. Our model requires that ￿rms be innovative from the start of their
lives, and thus an innovative ￿rm that falls below threshold value in its ￿rst period would be
inappropriately dropped if we restricted the sample only to ￿rms for which we always observe
R&D expenditure. By contrast, the patent data are universally observed. To ensure a complete
distribution, we thus use patents to impute R&D values for ￿rms that are less than the certainty
A-7threshold and not sub-sampled.32 As the R&D expenditures in these sub-sampled cases are
low (by de￿nition), this imputation choice versus treating unsurveyed R&D expenditures as
zero expenditures conditional on patenting is not very important. The ￿rm does not need to
conduct R&D or patent in every year of the initial ￿ve-year window, but the ￿rm must do one
of the two activities at least once.
The main text outlines how we focus on ￿rms that are initially innovative, including those
that transition out of innovation, but do not allow non-innovative incumbents to enter. Note
that it would have been impossible to build a consistent sample that would also include in-
cumbents switching into innovation. To see why, consider keeping all of the past records for
incumbent ￿rms that start conducting R&D in 1987. In the prior periods, this approach would
induce a mismeasurement of exit propensities and growth dynamics because a portion of the
sample will include ￿rms conditioned on survival until 1987.
Thus, our compiled dataset includes innovative ￿rms in the energy sector from 1975-2004.
A record in our dataset is a ￿rm-period observation that aggregates over the ￿rm￿ s di⁄erent
establishments.33 In addition to the statistics reported in the main text, our sample accounts
for over a trillion dollars in sales, 3.9 million employees, and 25 billion dollars in R&D expen-
ditures, and the ￿rms obtain 56,000 patents during 1995-1999.
Several additional points are worth noting about the sample and our data approach. First,
we generally include technologies that are designed to make fossil fuels cleaner in the dirty-
energy group. In this one regard, we deviate from the classi￿cations developed by Popp and
Newell (2012) where coal liquefaction and gasi￿cation are included in alternative energy, for
example. When we directly use Popp and Newell￿ s (2012) technology scheme as a robustness
check, we classify the technologies as in their original work. Second, we have not built our
sample selection or grouping procedures around technologies related to pollution abatement.
We retain all patents for included ￿rms, and thus they are part of our overall technology
description, but we only use energy-directed patents to classify patents and ￿rms into dirty-
or clean-energy groups. Finally, we also use the more detailed information the R&D Survey
collects from selected major R&D producers. We speci￿cally utilize information collected from
about 100 ￿rms on R&D expenditures related to speci￿c energy applications like coal or solar
energy. We earlier identi￿ed one application of this extra information in that we manually
searched the major patenting technology codes from these R&D entities to identify energy-
sector patenting groups that we should be including. A second application is to verify our
data development procedures, for example by assigning ￿rms based upon the types of R&D
they conduct rather than observed patents. This group from the R&D Survey also con￿rms
the bimodal nature of our ￿rm groupings. While the group of ￿rms asked these questions is
32In a small number of cases where we have scientists counts from the R&D Survey but lack R&D expenditures,
we similarly use the scientist counts to impute R&D values for ￿rms below the certainty threshold.
33We exclude approximately 50 non-pro￿t research centers and similar entities to match our model￿ s focus on
pro￿t-seeking ￿rms. Our estimations are robust to retaining these entities.
A-8too small and selected to serve as the backbone of our sample, these checks are comforting.
While Census Bureau disclosure prevents us from listing ￿rms, we overlap well with Popp and
Newell￿ s (2012) listed producers as one example.
Tables A1 and A2 provide additional results mentioned in the main text:
Table A1. Poisson Estimates for ￿ Parameter
R&D Input Measure Hf
Technique, Firm Size Measure uf: R&D Expenditure Scientist Counts
Random E⁄ects, SIC4 Counts 0:326 (0:122) 0:361 (0:079)
Fixed E⁄ects, SIC4 Counts 0:321 (0:106) 0:357 (0:089)
Random E⁄ects, Establishments 0:567 (0:108) 0:584 (0:064)
Fixed E⁄ects, Establishments 0:565 (0:103) 0:583 (0:076)
Notes: Table presents ￿xed and random e⁄ects Poisson estimates similar to Table 1.
Table A2. Initial Condition Distributions SIC3
Metric: Clean Energy Dirty Energy
Mean Patent Total 260 1029
Standard Deviation 515 1500
Share: [0,20] 37% 0%
Share: [21,100] 25% 6%
Share: [101,500] 22% 50%
Share: [500+] 16% 44%
Table A3 summarizes the alternative initial technology distribution considered in the ro-
bustness analysis. The average gap to the frontier for dirty-patent stocks in the 9% of cases
where clean patents have the lead is 463 patents, or in relative terms, 33% of the total patenting
in that line to date. The average gap to the frontier for clean-patent stocks in the 91% of cases
where dirty patents have the lead is 624 patents and 82% in relative terms. The distribution
graph has a broadly similar shape as Figure 3. The fraction of product lines with a non-zero
gap in terms of step sizes is 82%. Clean energy leads by one or more step sizes in 7% of
cases. Dirty energy has a lead of 20 and 50 step sizes or more in 8% and 2% of technologies,
respectively.
Table A3. Initial Condition Distributions SIC4
Metric: Clean Energy Dirty Energy
Mean Patent Total 140 663
Standard Deviation 401 1242
Share: [0,20] 53% 2%
Share: [21,100] 23% 18%
Share: [101,500] 17% 48%
Share: [500+] 6% 33%
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